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Case No. 20100188-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Robert Ferretti, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from the denial of a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to 
murder, a first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-lO3(2)0) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by rejecting Defendant's claim 
that his plea was not knowing, where the record shows that Defendant knew he was 
admitting to intentionally or knowingly killing the victim by shooting her in the 
head? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Lovell, 2010 UT 48, ^ 5,661 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 20. Findings of fact supporting the court's ruling are reviewed for clear error. 
See id. 
2. Has Defendant proved that the trial court violated his rights to counsel 
and due process by denying his continuance motion, where Defendant has not 
shown how he was prejudiced by the court's ruling? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a continuance 
for abuse of discretion. State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45,110,131 P.3d 292 
3. Has Defendant proved that the prosecutor breached the plea 
agreement, where Defendant's claim rests entirely on extra-record evidence? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue because 
Defendant did not raise it below. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and court rules are 
attached at Addendum A: 
U.S. Const, amend. VI; U.S. Const, amend. XIV; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2008); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2010); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 17,2009, Defendant was charged with one count each of murder, a 
first degree felony, and obstructing justice, a second degree felony. R. 1-2. After a 
preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over as charged. R. 75-76. A jury trial 
was set for January 11-15,2010. R. 85. 
On January 11, 2010, the trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea to the 
murder charge as part of a plea bargain. R. 281-87, 288-96, 298. In exchange, the 
State agreed to dismiss the obstructing justice charge; to write a letter to the parole 
board asking it "to consider the Defendant's willingness to plead guilty to murder 
as mitigation in considering his eventual release"; and to ask the trial court to make 
the same recommendation to the parole board. R. 292. Sentencing was set for 
February 10,2010. R. 298. 
At sentencing, but before announcement of sentence, Defendant orally moved 
to withdraw his plea, asserting that his plea may not have been knowingly entered. 
R. 306. After reviewing the plea proceedings, the trial court denied the motion and 
sentenced Defendant to fifteen years to life in prison. R. 306-07. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 310. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The crime} When Defendant and his friend, Robert Underwood, lived 
together in Salt Lake City around 2005 or 2006, they would talk about taking 
someone up to the mountains and shooting them "just to know if we could do it." 
PSI at 20. But then Underwood moved back to Colorado. Id. 
On November 3, 2008, Defendant picked up a former girlfriend, Tiffany 
Jarmon, in Salt Lake City, and drove north on 1-15 in his Toyota 4-runner. PSI at 5, 
8. Somewhere between Salt Lake City and Logan, Utah, Defendant fatally shot 
Tiffany in the head. PSI at 8,21. He then dumped Tiffany's body "off the side of the 
road down a steep embankment near the Logan River/' PSI at 4. Tiffany's body 
was found by a passerby on November 8, 2008. PSI at 5. 
After the murder, Defendant removed the front passenger seat from his 4-
Runner and sold the car to a junk yard. PSI at 6. When officers recovered the car, 
they found Jarmon's blood throughout the front part of the car, particularly on the 
passenger side door, floorboard, and glove compartment. PSI at 7. 
Defendant has not included a transcript of the preliminary hearing in the 
record on appeal. Thus, the facts of the crime are taken primarily from the 
transcript of Defendant's plea hearing and from Defendant's presentence 
investigation report. 
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Police questioned Defendant at his place of work about the murder, but did 
not arrest him. PSI at 6. Shortly thereafter, Defendant fled the Salt Lake area. PSI 
at 7. 
In January 2009, Defendant called his friend, Robert Underwood, who was 
still living in Colorado. PSI at 8, 20. After Underwood picked Defendant up, 
Defendant told him that "he had did this" and "that it didn't bother him at all/' PSI 
at 20-21. Defendant told Underwood "that he didn't make it to where he planned to 
do it because the person would not shut up"; thus, Defendant told Underwood, 
Defendant just shot her in the front seat of his car. PSI at 21. According to 
Underwood, Defendant "said he laughed and said oh what ain't got anything to say 
now." PSI at 21. 
Underwood contacted the Cache County Sheriffs Office on March 12,2009, to 
report the murder. PSI at 8,22. Defendant was arrested in Colorado on March 13, 
2009, and returned to Utah on March 24, 2009. PSI at 8. While awaiting trial, 
Defendant admitted to another inmate, Nathan Douros, that he shot Jarmon in his 
car, that she was crying when he shot her, and that she "deserved to die because she 
was a 'crack whore/" PSI at 8. Defendant also told Douros that, after killing 
Jarmon, he "drove to Logan and discarded the body in Logan Canyon." Id. Finally, 
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Defendant told Douros that he had told Underwood about the murder and "had 
thoughts about killing Underwood/' Id. 
Defendant's guilty plea. On the morning trial was set to begin, Defendant, 
through counsel, announced that he had reached a plea agreement with the State, in 
which Defendant would plead guilty to the murder charge in exchange for the 
State's dismissal of the obstructing justice charge, a letter from the State to the board 
of pardons, and a request from the State that the court also send a letter to the board 
of pardons. R. 314:3,10; R. 288-96. 
In connection with his plea, Defendant signed a Notice of Plea Bargain Rule 
11 Waiver/Statement of Facts (Notice). R. 288-96 (attached at Addendum C). 
Paragraph 1 of the Notice, which addressed the nature of Defendant's charges and 
the elements of the offenses, defined the elements of murder: "on or about October 
to November 2008, the defendant intentionally or knowingly ca[u]sed the death of 
another, to wit, Tiffany B. Jarmon." R. 289. Paragraph 2 stated that, as part of the 
agreement, Defendant would enter a guilty plea to murder. Id. Paragraph 3 stated: 
"I understand that the elements of the above offense the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt are that I intentionally or knowingly caused the death ot another, 
Tiffany Britt Jarmon." Id. 
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Paragraph 8 of the Notice set forth the rights Defendant would waive as a 
result of his guilty plea, including that "[t]he government must prove each and 
every element of the offense(s) charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt." R. 
291. Paragraph 9 stated: "I understand that by pleading guilty there will be no trial 
of any kind, and that I am admitting that I committed the crime as charged/' Id. 
Paragraph 13 stated: "I know that under a plea of guilty the judge may ask me 
questions about the offense, and that I will have to admit my participation in 
committing the crime/' R. 292. 
The Notice stated, as a factual basis for Defendant's plea, that: 
1. Sometime in the months of October to November, 2008,1 
met with Tiffany Britt Jarmon. I had known Tiffany Britt Jarmon prior 
to this date[;] 
2. That during this time I took the life of Tiffany Britt Jarmon. 
I drove her to Cache County Utah, where I shot her in the head in my 
car, taking her life. I then pushed her body down an embankment next 
to the side of the road and fled. 
R. 293. 
Finally, the Notice stated: "I understand that I may request to withdraw my 
guilty plea any time prior to sentencing or forfeit the right to do so. A motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea will only be granted upon good cause and is within the 
discretion of the Court." R. 293. The Notice also stated, "I have no mental 
reservations concerning this plea." R. 294. 
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The Certificate of Attorney executed at the close of the Notice stated that 
defense counsel had reviewed the Notice with Defendant and believed Defendant 
"fully understands the meaning of its content." R. 295. Moreover, "[t]o the best of 
my knowledge and belief..., the elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of 
the Defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated." Id. 
In connection with his plea, Defendant also completed a Statement of 
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel (Statement). R. 288-
96,281-287 (attached at Addendum D). The Statement stated that the elements of 
the crime to which Defendant was pleading were "set forth in Count 1 of the 
criminal information." R. 282. The Statement also stated that the factual basis for 
the plea was "[a]s stated in court" and that those facts "prove the elements of the 
crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty." Id. The Statement indicated that the full 
extent of the State's agreement was that, in exchange for his plea, the State would 
dismiss the obstructing justice charge. R. 294. Finally, the Statement stated: "I 
understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty . . . plea(s), I must file a written 
motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced," that "I 
will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause," and that "I will not 
be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason." R. 285. 
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At the plea hearing, the trial court reiterated — paragraph by paragraph—all 
the information contained in the Notice of Plea Bargain Rule 11 Waiver/Statement 
of Facts, confirming after each paragraph that Defendant understood the paragraph 
just read. R. 314:3-11 (transcript attached at Addendum B). Thus, Defendant 
confirmed to the court that he understood the elements of murder to be "that on or 
about October to November of 2008, that the defendant, which is you, intentionally 
or knowingly caused the death of another, to-wit: Tiffany Jarm[o]n." R. 314:4. 
Defendant confirmed that he understood that, absent his plea, the State would have 
to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 314:5-6, 8. Defendant 
confirmed that, by pleading guilty, he was "admitting that [he] committed the crime 
as charged/' R. 314:9. Defendant confirmed the factual basis for his plea, as stated 
in the Notice. R. 314:11. And Defendant confirmed that he understood that he 
could "request to withdraw [his] guilty plea at any time prior to sentencing or forfeit 
the right to do so," and that a motion to withdraw "would only be granted upon 
good cause and is within the discretion of the Court." R. 314:12. 
The court then directed Defendant's attention to the Statement he had 
completed, noting that it "goes over the same things that [the court] just went over 
with you on the record." R. 314:14. After Defendant stated that he was pleading 
guilty to the murder charge, the trial court accepted Defendant's plea. R. 314:14-15. 
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The prosecutor thereafter provided additional facts supporting Defendant's 
plea, including that "after having shot Tiffany Jarm[o]n in the head with a 9 
millimeter handgun, the defendant, after disposing of her body, disposed or tried to 
get rid of the evidence in this case and after pursuing that course of action, admitted 
this incident to at least two other individuals." R. 314:16. And Defendant 
confirmed to the court that he was "entering [his] plea because those things actually 
occurred." R. 314:17. 
After setting a sentencing date, Defendant stated, "Your Honor, I would like 
to say that I never intended initially for Ms. Jarm[o]n to die." R. 314:19. The court 
then asked, "Did you knowingly and intentionally take her life, Mr. Ferretti?" R. 
314:20. Defendant responded, "I have trouble saying yes, I did. I was under the 
influence of drugs and alcohol at the time and we were in an argument." Id. The 
court then stated: 
Mr. Ferretti, I understand that, but by so stating and we've 
already gone over all this, but I'm going to go over it again, in order for 
me to accept your plea, I understand that you were under the influence 
of drugs and alcohol, but when you committed the act that you did by 
shooting her in the head, did you understand that that would be — that 
you would be taking her life? 
R. 314:20. Defendant responded, "Yes." Id. The court then stated, "All right. We'll 
continue to accept your plea." Id. 
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Defendanfs motion to withdraw his plea. As Defendant's sentencing hearing 
opened, Defendant stated that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 315:3 
(transcript attached at Addendum E). The court instructed Defendant that his 
desire "needs to be articulated, the reasons set forth in a motion," and then asked 
defense counsel how much time he needed to file a motion. R. 315:4. Defense 
counsel asked for two weeks because "I haven't researched the grounds for this 
plea, your Honor." R. 315:4. However, counsel added, "given the fact that he has 30 
days from the date of entering that plea and we're right on the cusp of that," "I'd 
make a verbal motion on his behalf at this time to toll that time period and then we 
would buttress that with—with a written motion, after we look into whether there 
are in fact grounds." R. 315:4. The trial court agreed to Defendant's request and set 
the State's response accordingly. R. 315:4-5. 
After a recess, during which the parties met with the court in chambers, the 
court recalled the matter on the record, explaining that "[t]he State requested time to 
make a motion and so that's why we're back." R. 315:7. As part of that motion, the 
State noted that, under Utah's plea withdrawal statute, Defendant "needs leave of 
the Court and he must make a showing as to why his plea is not knowing and 
voluntary." R. 315:8. Thus, the State asked the court "to ask the defendant for a 
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good faith basis on why he believes he has the right at this juncture to withdraw his 
plea and what the basis for that is." R. 315:9. 
Defense counsel objected to the State's request because "having [Defendant] 
express the foundation for his desire to withdraw his guilty plea is something of a 
legal argument for which he's not trained." Id. According to counsel, "it would be a 
more prudent course to actually allow him, with the aid of counsel, to go through all 
the documentation that was signed on the date the plea was entered, to actually 
review all of the information, including the —the transcript and the record on that 
date and establish grounds, if any in fact do exist" Id. Defense counsel stated that, 
after speaking with Defendant, he was "not exactly sure what the foundation of [his] 
argument would be," and, thus, "at this time, I'm not prepared to argue a motion to 
withdraw" and would request "time, with the aid of counsel, [for him] to prepare a 
formal motion, if, in fact, one is warranted in this case." R. 315:10. 
The State again objected, asserting that "[w]e don't believe there is any good 
faith reason for him to withdraw his plea." R. 315:10. 
The court ruled that it would "require [Defendant] to give me a good faith 
basis on which he is withdrawing his plea, by telling me in some way or another 
and then if— if it rises even to a level of a good faith basis, then we'll go with the 
times that we previously discussed this morning and —to allow you more time to 
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address this on a legal basis." "But," the court added, "either he has a good faith 
basis to show that his plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily or he doesn't. 
If he does, then I'll certainly allow the defense time to move forward and flesh it out 
and put it into [a] more legal format, but certainly, without even the basis of that, 
I'm not going to proceed." R. 315:11. 
The trial court then gave defense counsel time to consult with Defendant 
before asking again that Defendant "articulate for the record why it is that you feel 
that your plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily." R. 315:12. Defendant 
stated that while reading the paperwork supporting his plea, "the wording was 
changed to where I did not knowingly or intentionally cause the death of this girl," 
and "I signed that." R. 315:13. "Then, upon standing in front of you, you told me 
that it was knowingly and I may have misunderstood between those two, but I did 
not intentionally cause the death of this girl." Id. 
After giving Defendant time to review both documents submitted during the 
plea hearing, the court asked, "Is there anything in there that you think was 
changed or you didn't read through or that I didn't talk to you about at the time I 
took your plea?" R. 315:18-19. Defendant responded, "I don't believe so, your 
Honor." R. 315:19. 
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When Defendant was asked whether he remembered the court reviewing 
with him "every single paragraph" of the Notice of Plea Bargain Rule 11 
Waiver/Statement of Facts at the plea hearing, Defendant responded, "[vjaguely, 
sir/' R. 315:14. When the court asked Defendant whether, at the time he entered his 
plea, he said he did intentionally or knowing cause Tiffany's death, Defendant 
responded, "Apparently so." Id. Defendant also "vaguely remember[ed]" telling 
the court on the date of the plea that he understood the elements of the charge to 
which he had plead. R. 315:15. And Defendant did not challenge the trial court's 
memory that, when he entered his plea, Defendant told the court that he understood 
the elements of the crime and admitted that he intentionally and knowingly caused 
Tiffany's death. R. 315:19-21. Indeed, when asked, "Would you believe me if I told 
you that's what you told me when I asked you," Defendant responded, "Yes. I 
would." R. 315:19-21. 
The trial court denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea: "I find 
that Mr. Ferretti has not been able to articulate a good faith basis as to why his plea 
was not knowingly and voluntarily made at the time." R. 315:21. Moreover, "I 
made that finding at the time you entered it and I'm making it again today, that 
there's no basis whatsoever for you to show that it was not made knowingly and 
voluntarily." R. 315:22. The trial court then proceeded to sentencing. R. 315:22. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant argues that the court 
should have granted his motion because, at the plea hearing, the court "never asked 
the question whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was admitting to all 
the elements of the crime/, Thus, according to Defendant, "[w]hen he pled guilty he 
did not realize that he was admitting that he knowingly or intentionally caused the 
death of Ms. Jarmon." Aplt. Br. at 17-18. 
To withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must show that his plea was not 
knowing or voluntary. In this case, both the documents Defendant signed before 
entering his plea and the court's colloquy with Defendant at the plea hearing 
establish that Defendant understood that he was pleading guilty to intentionally or 
knowingly killing Tiffany Jarmon. Defendant's responses to the trial court's 
questioning at the withdrawal hearing do nothing to undermine that conclusion. 
Point II. Defendant claims that the trial court violated his rights to counsel 
and due process when it required him to argue his motion to withdraw instead of 
granting a continuance to allow counsel additional time to prepare the motion. 
To the extent Defendant's right to counsel claim rests on the trial court's 
conduct of the plea withdrawal hearing, at no point did the trial court refuse 
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counsel's participation at that hearing. Rather, counsel simply stated he had 
nothing to say. And Defendant cites no legal authority holding that, under such 
circumstances, a trial court's decision to require the defendant to present his motion 
constitutes the denial of counsel. 
To the extent Defendant's right to counsel claim rests on the trial court's 
decision not to grant a continuance, Defendant cites no legal authority addressing 
the circumstances under which the denial of a continuance constitutes a denial of 
counsel. In particular, Defendant fails to cite well-established case law holding that 
the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on continuances, and that its rulings 
will not be reversed absent a showing of prejudice. Moreover, where Defendant 
does not identify a single new ground for withdrawal that counsel would have 
raised had a continuance been granted, Defendant has not shown that he was 
prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. 
Defendant's due process claim also fails. To the extent his claim rests on the 
trial court's conduct of the plea withdrawal hearing, the record does not support 
any contention that the trial court denied Defendant his right to be heard on the 
claim he raised. To the extent Defendant's claim rests on the trial court's denial of 
his continuance motion, Defendant cites no legal authority addressing the 
circumstances under which the denial of a continuance constitutes a denial of due 
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process. In particular, Defendant fails to cite well-established case law holding that 
the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on continuances, and that its rulings 
will not be reversed absent a showing of prejudice. Moreover, where Defendant 
does not identify a single new ground for withdrawal that counsel would have 
raised had a continuance been granted, Defendant has not shown that he was 
prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. 
Point III. Defendant claims that this Court should allow him to withdraw his 
plea because, according to Defendant, the State failed to timely send a letter to the 
parole board, as promised in the plea agreement. In support of his claim, however, 
Defendant relies only on evidence outside the record on appeal. Because this Court 
does not consider extra-record evidence on appeal, this Court must reject his claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA, WHERE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT 
DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD HE WAS ADMITTING TO 
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY KILLING HIS VICTIM 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant argues that the court should have 
granted his motion because, at the plea hearing, the court "never asked the question 
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whether he understood that by pleading guilty he was admitting to all the elements 
of the crime/, Aplt. Br. at 17-18. Thus, according to Defendant, "[w]hen he plead 
guilty he did not realize that he was admitting that he knowingly or intentionally 
caused the death of Ms. Jarmon." Id. The record rebuts Defendant's claim. 
A, To withdraw a guilty plea, Defendant must show that the plea was 
not knowingly or voluntarily entered. 
Defendant acknowledges that "'[t]he withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a 
privilege, not a right.'" Aplt. Br. at 16 (quoting State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040,1040-
42 (Utah 1987)). However, Defendant cites case law holding that "'a presentence 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea should, in general, be liberally granted/" Id. 
(quoting Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1040-42). Thus, according to Defendant, although the 
party "'who would set a plea aside has the burden of proving that there is a legal 
ground for doing so/" id. (quoting Gallegos, 738 R2d at 1040-42), that burden " 'is 
relatively low in a presentence setting/" id. (quoting State v. Ruiz, 2009 UT App 121, 
111, 210 P.3d 955). 
But even under the case law Defendant cites, a defendant must at least 
present "'a fair and just reason for granting leave to withdraw the plea/" Ruiz, 2009 
UT App 121, \ 11 (quoting Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1042). Defendant here presented no 
such reason. Despite his contention otherwise, see Aplt. Br. at 17-18, a review of the 
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plea hearing establishes both that Defendant understood the elements of the crime 
to which he was pleading and that Defendant understood that, by pleading guilty, 
he was admitting that his conduct met those elements. 
"Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of guilty 
pleas." State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28, % 11,114 P.3d 569. Under rule 11, the trial court 
bears the burden "to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly 
knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly 
waived his or her constitutional rights/" Id. (quoting State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, % 
11, 22 P.3d 1242). The objective "is to ensure that defendants know of their rights 
and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty." 
Visser, 2000 UT 88,111. 
Once a guilty plea has been accepted, however, it "may be withdrawn only 
upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made.v Utah Code Arm. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 2010); see also State v. Merrill, 
2005 UT 34, t 45,114 P.3d 585 ("The right to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea is 
granted by statute."). This is the same standard necessary to prove that a plea is 
unconstitutional. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) ("[Ijf a 
defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained 
in violation of due process and is therefore void."). And neither the United States 
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nor the Utah constitutions requires strict compliance with rule 11 in order for a plea 
to be voluntary and knowing. See Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,992 (Utah 1993). 
Indeed, in 2005, rule 11 itself was amended to provide that" [a]ny variance from the 
procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be 
disregarded/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 11(1). 
Thus, while "[a] strict [rule 11] compliance violation . . . almost certainly 
constitute [d] an abuse of discretion" in denying a withdrawal motion before 2005, 
Aplt. Br. at 18 (citing State v. Lovell, 2010 UT 48, 661 Utah Adv. Rep. 20), a rule 11 
violation now constitutes an abuse of discretion only if that violation rendered the 
defendant's plea unknowing and involuntary. See Lovell, 2010 UT 48, f^ 81 (holding 
that "from the period of time following Gibbons [i.e., the court's adoption of the strict 
compliance rule] until rule 11 was amended in 2005 to incorporate harmless error 
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review, a trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11(e) is an error that 
requires reversal").2 
Thus, to warrant withdrawal of his 2009 plea, Defendant "must show that the 
guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary." Id/, see also Moench v. State, 2004 
UT App 57, f 16, 88 P.3d 353. To show that a guilty plea was unknowing or 
involuntary, Defendant must show either that he "[did] not understand the nature 
of the constitutional protections that he [was] waiving" or that "he [had] such an 
incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent 
admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976) (citations 
omitted). Where, as here, Defendant makes his claim under only the second part of 
this test, his claim succeeds only if he can show that he did not "possess[] an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 
243 (1969) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
2
 Although the supreme court in Lovell inconsistently suggested that a trial 
court's failure to advise a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule 11(e) 
renders his plea unknowing and involuntary, see Lovell, 2010 UT 48, ^ 69-70, the 
State has petitioned for rehearing on that issue. In any case, Defendant here does 
not claim that the trial court failed to advise him of his constitutional rights under 
rule 11(e). Rather, he claims only that he did not understand that he was admitting 
that he intentionally and knowingly killed Tiffany Jarmon when he entered his plea 
and, therefore, that his plea was unknowing and involuntary. The quoted part of 
Lovell, therefore, has no application to this case. 
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Finally, a court considering such a claim is not limited to the record of the 
plea hearing. See State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28, f t 11-13,114 P.3d 569 ((holding that, 
even in rule 11 cases, courts may consider plea hearing transcript, plea affidavits, 
and other documents in record); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 11(1) ("Compliance with 
this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole/'). 
B, Defendant has not shown that his plea was not knowing and 
voluntary. 
Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his motion to 
withdraw because the trial court at the plea hearing failed to ensure that he 
understood "the plea [was] an admission of all [the] elements" of murder. Aplt. Br. 
at 17-18 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A)). Thus, Defendant asserts, "[w]hen he 
pled guilty he did not realize he was admitting that he knowingly or intentionally 
caused the death of Ms. Jarmon." Aplt. Br. at 18. The record from the plea hearing 
refutes Defendant's claim. 
As stated, in connection with his plea, Defendant signed a Notice of Plea 
Bargain Rule 11 Waiver/Statement of Facts (Notice). R. 288-96. Paragraph 1 of the 
Notice defined the elements of murder as: "on or about October to November 2008, 
the defendant intentionally or knowingly ca[u]sed the death of another, to wit, 
Tiffany B. Jarmon." R. 289. In Paragraph 3, Defendant stated that he understood 
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"that the elements of the above offense the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt are that [he] intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another, Tiffany 
Britt Jarmon." Id. In Paragraph 9, Defendant stated that he understood that, by 
pleading guilty, he was "admitting that [he] committed the crime as charged." Id. 
In Paragraph 13, Defendant stated that he understood that, by entering his plea, he 
would "have to admit [his] participation in committing the crime." R. 292. 
Defendant's Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate 
of Counsel (Statement) stated that the elements of the crime to which Defendant was 
pleading were "set forth in Count 1 of the criminal information." R. 282. Count 1 of 
the information alleged: "That the above named defendant on or about October-
November, 2008, (a) intentionally or knowingly caused the death of TJ." R. 1. The 
Statement also stated that the factual basis for the plea was "[a]s stated in court" and 
that those facts "prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty." 
R. 282. 
At the plea hearing, the trial court read almost verbatim all the information 
contained in the Notice, confirming after each paragraph that Defendant understood 
the paragraph just read. R. 314:3-11. Thus, Defendant confirmed to the court that 
he understood the elements of murder to be "that on or about October to November 
of 2008, that the defendant, which is you, intentionally or knowingly caused the 
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death of another, to-wit: Tiffany Jarm[o]n." R. 314:4. Defendant confirmed that he 
understood that, absent his plea, the State would have to prove those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt. R. 314:5-6, 8. Defendant also confirmed that, by 
pleading guilty, he was "admitting that [he] committed the crime as charged/' R. 
314:9. 
The prosecution provided additional facts supporting Defendant's plea, 
including that "after having shot Tiffany Jarm[o]n in the head with a 9 millimeter 
handgun, the defendant, after disposing of her body, disposed or tried to get rid of 
the evidence in this case and after pursuing that course of action, admitted this 
incident to at least two other individuals." R. 314:16. Defendant confirmed to the 
court that he was "entering [his] plea because those things actually occurred." R. 
314:17. 
After the court set a sentencing date, Defendant stated, "Your Honor, I would 
like to say that I never intended initially for Ms. Jarm[ojn to die." R. 314:19. The 
court then clarified, "Did you knowingly and intentionally take her life, Mr. 
Ferretti?" R. 314:20. Defendant responded, "I have trouble saying yes, I did. I was 
under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time and we were in an argument." 
Id. The court then stated: "I understand that you were under the influence of drugs 
and alcohol, but when you committed the act that you did by shooting her in the 
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head, did you understand that that would be — that you would be taking her life?" 
R. 314:20. Defendant responded, "Yes." Id. 
This record establishes that Defendant understood that the elements of the 
murder charge to which he was pleading guilty were that he "intentionally or 
knowingly ca[u]sed the death of another, to wit, Tiffany B. Jarmon." R. 1,282,289, 
295; R. 314:4. Despite Defendant's contention otherwise, this record also establishes 
that Defendant entered his guilty plea knowing "that the plea [was] an admission of 
all [the] elements" of murder, Aplt. Br. at 17, and, therefore, that by pleading guilty 
he was admitting that he knowingly or intentionally caused the death of Ms. 
Jarmon, Aplt. Br. at 18. R. 282, 291, 292,295; R. 314:9. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to withdraw because his plea was not knowing or voluntary, therefore, fails. 
IL 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVED THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
VIOLATED HIS RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS 
WHEN IT DENIED HIS MOTION TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT 
GRANTING A CONTINUANCE 
Defendant claims that he "was denied his right to due process and counsel" 
when the trial court denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Aplt. Br. at 21-
24. Defendant's arguments are not particularly clear. However, concerning his 
right to counsel claim, Defendant appears to assert first that because he never 
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sought self-representation, the trial court violated his right to counsel when, during 
argument on his withdrawal motion, it required him "in essence [to] act as his own 
lawyer in articulating a good faith basis to withdraw his plea/' Aplt. Br. at 21. 
Alternatively, Defendant asserts that the court violated his right to counsel because 
he "was within the time frame allowed to withdraw a plea and his attorneys[] 
should have been given opportunity to prepare and argue the motion." Id. at 24. 
Defendant's due process claim appears to be that the trial court denied him his 
rights to notice and to be heard on his withdrawal motion "by not granting a 
continuance." Id. at 23. 
This Court should reject Defendant's claims/ 
A. Defendant's right to counsel claims fail, 
1. Defendant has not shown that the trial court violated his right 
to counsel at the plea withdrawal hearing. 
As stated, Defendant appears to claim that the trial court violated his right to 
counsel when, at the plea withdrawal hearing, it required him "in essence [to] act as 
3
 Although the first sentence of Defendant's argument suggests that he raises 
his claims under both "the Utah and United States Constitutions," Defendant cites 
no Utah constitutional provisions in support of his claim. Aplt. Br. at 21-24. This 
Court, therefore, should not consider Defendant's state constitutional claims. See 
State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 16,164 P.3d 397 ("[W]e have repeatedly refrained 
from engaging in state constitutional law analysis unless 'an argument for different 
analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed.'") (citation omitted). 
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his own lawyer in articulating a good faith basis to withdraw his plea/' Aplt. Br. at 
21. This claim is inadequately briefed. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a defendant's 
brief"shall contain... citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Under this rule, "a reviewing court is entitled 
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20,63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
" [i]mplicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to authority but development 
of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998); accord State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989). 
In short, this Court "will not engage in constructing arguments 'out of whole 
cloth' on behalf of defendants." State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 n.2 (Utah App. 1990). 
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the 
reviewing court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, % 12, 
69 P.3d 1278. Similarly, "[wjhen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the 
court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Gamer, 2002 UT App 234, f 12, 52 
P.3d 467. This Court will simply decline to consider the claim. See State v. Sloan, 
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2003 UT App 170, f 13, 72 R3d 138; State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 28,48 R3d 872; 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998). 
Here, to support his claim, Defendant cites case law addressing the well-
established principle that, as a general matter, a defendant has the right to counsel 
unless he "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently77 asserts his right to self-
representation. Aplt. Br. at 22 (citing State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,979 P.2d 799; State 
v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183,187 (Utah 1987); State v. Pedockie, 2004 UT App 224; 95 
P.3d 1182). Based on the foregoing, Defendant argues that because he "did not 
request self-representation" here, the trial court violated his right to counsel when it 
"forced him to immediately set forth legal grounds as to why his plea should be 
withdrawn." Id. at 23. 
In asserting his claim, Defendant ignores how the proceedings unfolded 
below. The trial court never precluded defense counsel from participating in 
Defendant's plea withdrawal motion. R. 315:1-22. To the contrary, the trial court 
asked defense counsel to explain the factual and/or legal bases of Defendant's 
withdrawal motion. R. 315:10. Counsel was simply unable to provide them. R. 
315:10. 
It was only then—after the trial court had honored Defendant's right to 
counsel—that the court sought the aid of Defendant. R. 315:11. Even then, the court 
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only required Defendant to offer a "good faith basis" for his withdrawal motion. R. 
315:11. The court expressly stated that if Defendant could offer a good faith basis, 
the court would "certainly allow the defense time to move forward and flesh it out/' 
R. 315:11. And the court allowed Defendant to consult with counsel before he 
offered his basis. R. 315:12. 
Defendant's three-page argument presents none of this background. See Aplt. 
Br. at 21-24; see Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (defendant's brief "shall contain... citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"). Nor does the case law he 
cites establish that, under such circumstances, a trial court violates a defendant's 
right to counsel by asking the defendant to provide at least some minimal basis for 
his motion to withdraw. See Aplt. Br. at 21-24; see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9);; 
Gomez, 2002 UT120, \ 20; Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; Webb, 790 P.2d at 72 n.2. 
In fact, the trial court may have exceeded Defendant's right to counsel by 
allowing him that opportunity, even though he was represented by counsel. Cf 
State v. Navarro, 2010 UT App 302,243 P.3d 519 (per curiam) (holding that trial court 
has no duty to entertain pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea when defendant is 
represented by counsel). 
This Court, therefore, should reject Defendant's claim as inadequately briefed. 
Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,113; Norris, 2001 UT 104, f 28; Bryant, 965 P.2d at 549. 
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2. Defendant has not shown that the trial court violated his right 
to counsel by denying his motion for a continuance. 
Alternatively, Defendant appears to argue that the trial court violated his 
right to counsel when it "ma[de] him argue the motion without allowing his court-
appointed attorney's [sic] time to prepare," Aplt. Br. at 23, i.e., by not granting a 
continuance to give counsel time to investigate whether a basis for his withdrawal 
motion existed. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
First, Defendant's right to counsel discussion focuses exclusively on the law 
governing self-representation. See Aplt. Br. at 21-24. Defendant provides no legal 
authority or analysis to support a contention that a trial court's denial of a 
continuance constitutes a violation of the right to counsel per se. See id. at 21-24; see 
also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ 20; Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; 
Wefefc,790P.2dat72n.2. 
In fact, under well-established law, trial courts have broad discretion to grant 
or deny continuances. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983); Ungar v. 
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964); State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, f 8, 116 P.3d 360. 
Moreover, "[n]ot every restriction on counsel's time or opportunity to investigate 
[through the denial of a continuance] violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel." Morris, 461 U.S. at 11. Rather, "only an unreasoning and arbitrary 
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'insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay7 
violates [those rights]/' Id. at 11-12 (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589). 
In other words, "'[t]he decision to grant or deny a requested continuance lies 
within the broad discretion of the trial court/" State v. Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 
45, f 10,131 P.3d 292 (quoting State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527,530 (Utah App. 1997)); 
accord Taylor, 2005 UT 40, f 8. Moreover, "[a]n abuse of discretion occurs [only] 
when a trial court denies a continuance and the resulting prejudice affects the 
substantial rights of the defendant, such that a 'review of the record persuades the 
court that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result for the defendant/'7 Taylor, 2005 UT 40, % 8 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 
913, 919 (Utah 1987)) (additional citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 
Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ^ 10 (defendant must show "show that [he] was 
prejudiced by the denial, since '[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded'") (quoting Utah 
R. Crim. P. 30(a)). 
To prevail on his claim that the trial court's denial of a continuance violated 
his right to counsel, therefore, Defendant must show not only that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion, but also "'that the denial resulted in 
actual prejudice/" Landrum v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 905, 927 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation 
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omitted); accord State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408,414 (Utah 1993) (rejecting claim that 
denial of continuance rendered defense counsel ineffective where defendant failed 
to show prejudice); United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36,79 (1st Cir. 2008); United 
State v. Rinaldi, 461 F.3d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 2006). 
Defendant cannot make either showing here. First, defense counsel candidly 
acknowledged below that he was not sure whether a basis for withdrawal existed. 
R. 315:9-10. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, 
where defense counsel provides no assurance that a continuance would be fruitful. 
See, e.g., State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750,752 (Utah 1982) ("Where the content of the 
prospective witness' testimony is speculative..., it is not an abuse of discretion to 
deny a continuance/'); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991) ("When 
moving for a continuance [at trial], a party must show that denial of the motion will 
prevent the party from obtaining material and admissible evidence, that any 
additional witnesses it seeks can be produced within a reasonable time, and that it 
has exercised due diligence in preparing for the case before requesting the 
continuance"). 
Second, the only basis for withdrawal presented by Defendant on appeal is 
the one raised and heard below. See Aplt. Br. at 15-24. Thus, Defendant has not 
identified any new basis for withdrawal that was not but would have been 
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presented had a continuance been granted. See id. Absent such a showing, 
Defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of a 
continuance, even if that denial were erroneous. See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12; Taylor, 
2005 UT 40, f 8 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)) (additional 
citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45,110. 
Defendant's right to counsel claim based on the trial court's denial of his 
continuance motion, therefore, fails. 
B. Defendants due process claims fail. 
To the extent the State is able to identify Defendant's due process claim, 
Defendant's claim appears to be that his due process rights to notice and an 
opportunity to be heard were violated when the trial court denied his requested 
continuance. See Aplt. Br. at 23 (quoting Becker v. Sunset City, 2009 UT App 197, f 7, 
216 P.3d 367). Defendant's claim fails because he did not preserve it below and does 
not argue plain error on appeal. See id. Alternatively, his claim fails on its merits. 
1. Defendant's unpreserved due process claim fails because 
Defendant does not argue plain error. 
"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in 
order to preserve an issue for appeal." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f 14,128 P.3d 
1171 (quoting State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, f 45,114 P.3d 551). "'When a party raises 
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an issue on appeal without having properly preserved the issue below/" this Court 
"'require[s] that the party articulate an appropriate justification for appellate 
review/" Id. (quoting Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45). "[Specifically, the party must 
argue either 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances.'" Id. (quoting Finder, 2005 
UT 15, If 15 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995))). If a 
defendant "does not argue that exceptional circumstances justifies review of the 
issue," this Court will "decline to consider it on appeal." Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 
n.5; accord Finder, 2005 UT 15, % 45. 
Here, the only due process claim Defendant raised in the trial court was that 
"he wasn't given due process under the, at least the Sixth Amendment, effective 
right of—of counsel." R. 315:25. Thus, the due process claim he raises on appeal 
was not preserved below. See id. Consequently, to raise this claim on appeal, 
Defendant must argue plain error or exceptional circumstances. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 
f 14; Finder, 2005 UT 15, %% 15,45; Feldger, 896 P2d at 1229 n.5 . Because he has not 
argued either, see Aplt. Br. at 21-24, this Court should decline to reach his due 
process claim. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45; Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229 n.5. 
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2. Defendant has not shown that the trial court violated his right 
to due process by denying his motion for a continuance. 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his due process right to be 
heard when it denied his continuance. But the trial court heard from both him and 
his counsel at the plea withdrawal hearing. R. 315. Defendant's three-page 
argument cites no case law holding that the trial court's denial of a continuance 
motion under such circumstances constitutes a denial of due process per se. See 
Aplt. Br. at 21-24; see also Utah R, App. P. 24(a)(9); Gomez, 2002 UT120, If 20; Tliomas, 
961 R2d at 305; Webb, 790 P.2d at 72 n.2. 
In fact, "not every denial of a request for more time... violates due process." 
Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589. Rather, as stated, trial courts have broad discretion to grant 
or deny continuance motions. See, e.g., Morris, 461 U.S. at 11; Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589; 
Taylor, 2005 UT 40,18; Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, If 10. "An abuse of discretion 
occurs [only] when a trial court denies a continuance and the resulting prejudice 
affects the substantial rights of the defendant, such that a 'review of the record 
persuades the court that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for the defendant.'" Taylor, 2005 UT 40, f^ 8 (quoting State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)) (additional citation and quotation marks 
omitted); accord Torres-Garcia, 2006 UT App 45, ^ 10. 
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To prevail on his claim that the trial court's denial of a continuance violated 
his due process rights, therefore, Defendant must show not only that the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying his motion, but "'must [also] show that the denial 
resulted in actual prejudice/7' Landrum, 625 F.3d at 927 (citation omitted); accord 
Cabututan, 861 P.2d at 414; DeCologero, 530 F.3d at 79; Rinaldi, 461 F.3d at 929. 
Defendant has not made that showing here. As stated, the only basis for 
withdrawal presented by Defendant on appeal is the one that was raised and heard 
below. See Aplt. Br. at 15-24. Thus, Defendant has not identified any new basis for 
withdrawal that was not but would have been presented had a continuance been 
granted. See id. Absent such a showing, Defendant cannot show that he was 
prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his continuance motion, even if that denial 
were erroneous. See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12; Taylor, 2005 UT 40, | 8; Torres-Garcia, 
2006UTApp45,f 10. 
III. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE STATE FAILED TO 
FULFILL ITS DUTY UNDER THE PLEA AGREEMENT FAILS 
WHERE IT RESTS ENTIRELY ON EXTRA-RECORD EVIDENCE 
Finally, Defendant asks this Court to allow him to withdraw his plea because 
the State violated the plea agreement by "f ail[ing] to write . . . in a timely manner" 
the letter to the Board of Pardons referenced in the plea agreement. Aplt. Br. at 24-
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26. Defendant acknowledges that "this issue was not preserved below/' because 
"[a] part of the facts regarding this issue were not discovered until after the 
defendant had been sentenced." Id. at 24. Defendant therefore "asks the Court to 
consider this issue under the exceptional circumstances exception to the 
requirement that issues be preserved from the trial court." Id. 
This Court must deny Defendant's request. The primary documents upon 
which Defendant's claim relies, see Aplt. Br. at Addendum A, were never made part 
of the appellate record. See Record. This Court "do[es] not consider new evidence 
on appeal." Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512,513 (Utah 1990); accord In re L.M., 2001UT 
App 314,116 n.3,37 P.3d 1188; State v. Vessey, 967 R2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998); 
State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1998).4 
4
 Even assuming arguendo the authenticity of the documents Defendant 
attaches at Addendum A, they do not establish that the prosecutor broke the plea 
agreement. The plea agreement states that the prosecutor would write a letter to the 
Board of Pardons stating that it should "consider the Defendant's willingness to 
plead guilty to murder as mitigation in considering his eventual release." R. 292. 
According to the letter attached to Defendant's brief, the prosecutor wrote that letter 
on June 23, 2010, just over four months after the trial court entered Defendant's 
sentence. See Aplt. Br. at Addendum A; R. 306-07. According to the April 28, 2010 
order from the Board of Pardons and Parole attached to Defendant's brief, its 
decision setting Defendant's initial parole hearing date for March 1,2034, "is subject 
to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at any time until actual release 
from custody." See Aplt. Br. at Addendum A. Thus, Defendant has not shown that 
the prosecutor's letter was "untimely." 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Respectfully submitted Tanuaryo? 7 , 2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK S 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
UNI II I) MAT I SC ONSIUUIION 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they 
reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the 
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis 
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one 
years of age in such state. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress 
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including 
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing 
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States 
nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be 
held illegal and void. 
Section 5, 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2008) Murder 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger 
than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual ibuse of a child under bection 
76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or 
(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding discharge of a 
firearm or dangerous weapon. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human 
life, the actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death 
to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or imme-
diate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate of-
fense, or is a party to the predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the 
course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from 
the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate of-
fense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commis-
sion or attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Sec-
tion 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is 
reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established 
under Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3) (a) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
an indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that 
the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of an-
other: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a rea-
sonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justifica-
tion or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable 
or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or 
the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined 
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circum-
stances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
(5) (a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate 
offense does not merge with the crime of murder. 
(b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense described 
in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, 
and punished for, the separate offense. 
Utah Code \nin. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2010) Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and 
a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in 
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be 
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to 
withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Sub-
section (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. RULE 11. PLEAS 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, 
or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not 
guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation 
fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the ourt 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for trial. 
A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases 
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements 
for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, 
and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the 
right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, 
the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the 
right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these 
rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those 
elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it establishes 
that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant 
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient 
evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, the 
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consec-
utive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if 
so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to with-
draw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a 
written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw a 
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 
77-13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a misdemeanor 
crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall ad-
vise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is unlawful for the 
defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition, The failure to 
advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to request 
or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of 
other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the 
defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
(i)(l) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement be-
ing made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of the 
parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecut-
ing attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with the 
plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to 
either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter 
a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the record 
the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of any 
specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to de-
termine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. 
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient 
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
THE COURT: This is the time set for trial but I 
understand we have a—a resolution to this case. 
MR. GALLOWAY: We do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Galloway. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Judge, it's our understanding that 
Mr. Ferretti will enter a guilty plea to the — to Count 1, 
murder charge, Count 2, obstructing of justice will be 
dismissed. 
THE COURT: Is that the State's understanding as 
well? 
MR. SWINK: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Ferretti, I'm going to go through a series of 
questions with you, okay? Now, I know that your attorneys 
have visited with you and that the document—I have a copy of 
it, this Notice of Plea Bargain, Rule 11 Waiver and Statement 
of Facts, that you've gone over that as well; is that correct? 
MR. FERRETTI: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. And just —I'm just going to 
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remind you, you need to, if you would, please, answer audibly 
for the record, okay? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ferretti, I know that 
you've read through it, but just to be thorough, I'm going to 
go through it with you as well, okay? 
MR. FERRETTI: Okay. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the charges 
against you are that you've been charged with murder, a first-
degree felony in violation of Utah Code 76-5-203, which is 
punishable pursuant to 76-6-203 (3) (b) as follows: 
A person who is convicted of murder shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not 
less than 15 years and which may be for life and further, 
according to Code, a fine not exceeding $10,000 may be imposed 
by the Judge. Do you understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the elements of 
that offense are that on or about October to November of 2008, 
that the defendant, which is you, intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of another, to-wit: Tiffany Jarman. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the second charge 
you've been charged with is obstruction of justice, a second-
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degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 76-8-306, which is 
punishable pursuant to Utah Code 76-203 to a possible maximum 
sentence of one to 15 years and life; do you understand that? 
THE COURT: Do you understand that also according to 
the Code not exceeding 10,000 may be imposed by the Judge? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand, Mr. Ferretti, that 
the elements of that offense according to Utah Code 
76-8-306(c) are that on or about October to November of 2008, 
the defendant, which again is you, with intent to hinder, 
delay or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction or punishment of any person regarding conduct that 
constitutes a criminal offense, altered, destroyed or 
concealed any item or writing? Do you understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that youfve--it has 
been discussed with the State that today you will enter a plea 
of guilty as follows: One count of murder in violation of 
Utah Code 76-5-203, a first-degree felony, carrying the afore-
mentioned sentence; do you understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that the elements of 
the offense as I stated must be--that the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that you intentionally or knowingly 
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caused the death of another and that would be Tiffany Brit 
Jarman; do you understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you can be 
represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding 
and that you know that if you cannot afford an attorney, one 
will be appointed for you and under — and do you understand 
that Mr. Galloway and Mr. Perry have been appointed to 
represent you and have so during this time period? Do you 
understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: And have you had enough opportunity to 
visit with your attorneys in this case? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you feel like that they have spent 
the time and effort needed to assist you in--in your defense 
of this case? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that before you 
can be held to answer for these charges, you have the right to 
a preliminary hearing? Do you understand that a preliminary 
hearing is designed to protect you from going to trial on the 
felony charges unless and until the State presents sufficient 
evidence before a magistrate to show that probable cause that 
the crimes that you are accused of were committed and that 
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there is probable cause to believe that you committed them? 
Do you realize that a preliminary hearing was 
conducted in this case already and that you were bound over on 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: And do you remember that I presided at 
that preliminary hearing, Mr. Ferretti? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. You understand that after 
your preliminary hearing, you entered a plea of not guilty to 
the charges; therefore, you had a right to a speedy trial and 
that trial was set for today. Do you understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you also understand that you still 
have the right to plead not guilty and that if you do plead 
not guilty, you can persist in that plea? Do you understand 
that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a right 
to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury and that if you 
were to stand trial by a jury, the following rights would 
attend to you: 
That you be presumed innocent at your trial; 
That you have the right against self-incrimination; 
You have the right to a speedy public trial before 
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an impartial jury; 
You have the right to confront and cross-examine 
in open court the prosecution's witnesses; 
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defense witnesses; 
You have the right to the assistance of counsel 
at every stage of the proceeding; 
You have the right to see and observe the witnesses 
who testify against you; 
That you can call such witnesses as you desire and 
that you can obtain subpoenas to require their 
attendance and testimony of those witnesses and that if 
you cannot afford to pay the witnesses and mileage fees 
of those witnesses, the government would pay them for 
you; 
That you cannot be forced to incriminate yourself 
and that you do not have to testify at trial. 
Do you also understand that if you choose not to 
testify at trial, the jury would be instructed that no 
inference adverse to you may be drawn from your failure to 
testify? 
And that the government must prove each and every 
element of the offense charged against you beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict 
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you and if you were convicted, you can appeal and if you 
cannot afford the cost of such an appeal, the government would 
pay the cost of the appeal, including the services of an 
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days from the final judgment of the Court. 
Now, I read a lot of rights. Do you understand that 
those rights you would have had if you went to trial? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you also understand that 
by pleading guilty, there will be no trial of any kind and 
that you are admitting that you committed the crime as charged 
and that you're waiving these rights, with the exception that 
your attorneys will continue to assist you until the 
conclusion of your case before the District Court? Do you 
understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you understand under the laws of 
Utah, the maximum sentence that can be imposed upon you--upon 
your plea of guilty to the charge identified previously, do 
you also understand that if you're on probation or parole or 
awaiting sentencing of another offense for which you have been 
convicted or plead guilty, that your plea in the present 
action can be used to revoke any probation or parole and can 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon you? 
And I understand you are not—there's nothing 
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pending on the parole or probation; is that correct? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that under 
a plea of guilty, the Judge may ask you questions about the 
offense, and I will, and that you admitted to your 
participation in the crime; do you understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: I'm going to review the agreement that 
you've entered into with the State. The State will drop — the 
State will drop all pending counts in the Information against 
you except for murder. The State agrees that sentencing can 
take place at any time, at the time of your plea, which would 
be today and will move the Court to impose a sentence of 
incarceration at the Utah State Prison of 15 years to life. 
That in exchange, the State will write a letter to the parole 
board with the following language: We would ask the Parole 
Board to consider the defendant's willingness to plead guilty 
to murder as mitigation in considering his eventual release. 
And finally, that the State will request myself to 
make the same recommendation; however, you understand that I 
cannot be bound by any sentencing agreement of the parties? 
Do you understand that, Mr. Ferretti? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
All right. The factual basis of your guilty plea is 
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as follows and I want to know if you understand this and you 
agree to this: Some time in the months of October to November 
of 2008, you met with Tiffany Brit Jarman and you had known 
T-i-F-F^ r^T? "D>--I+- Tov'rnar^  I^ VT_^ ->~ +-r\ •'-hat date* is that ccrr9ct? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is it correct also that during this 
time, you took the life of Tiffany Brit Jarman. You drove her 
to Cache County, Utah, where you shot her in the head, in your 
car, taking her life. You then pushed her body down an 
embankment next to the side of the road and fled. Is that 
correct, Mr. Ferretti? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ferretti, how old are you? 
MR. FERRETTI: Forty-three. 
THE COURT: And how many years of school have you 
completed? 
MR. FERRETTI: Fourteen. 
THE COURT: And you read and understand the English 
language? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ferretti, have any 
threats or promises of any sort been made to you to induce you 
or persuade you to enter into this plea, other than the 
negotiations as already stated? 
MR. FERRETTI: No, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Has anyone guaranteed you that you 
receive any form of leniency because of your plea and do you 
also understand that any recommendations made by the State may 
not be followed by myself or the parole board? Do you 
understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ferretti, do you understand that you 
may request to withdraw your guilty plea at any time prior to 
sentencing or forfeit the right to do so? A motion to 
withdraw your guilty plea would only be granted upon good 
cause and is within the discretion of the Court. Do you 
understand that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURt: Have you discussed this case and plea 
with your attorneys as much as you would like to? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you have no further questions of 
your attorneys prior to the Court taking your plea today? 
MR. FERRETTI: I have one. 
(Inaudible off-the-record discussion) 
MR. GALLOWAY: Okay, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ferretti, are you 
satisfied with your lawyers' counsel and advice? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Is your decision to enter this plea made 
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after full and careful thought, with the advice of counsel and 
with a full understanding of your rights? Do you understand 
that? 
MR. FEPJRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: And of the facts and circumstances of 
this case and the consequences of your plea, do you understand 
that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs 
or medications or intoxicants? 
MR. FERRETTI: No. 
THE COURT: You have no mental reservations 
regarding your plea? 
MR. FERRETTI: No. 
THE COURT: You're doing this of your own free will 
and choice? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Does the State — is there anything else the State 
would like me to review? 
MR. SWINK: I!d just like to make a record, your 
Honor, that the defendant has reviewed the document you just 
read to him with his attorneys and further, also filled out a 
waiver form which has been signed by the defendant and the 
State and his counsel as well. WeTd like to make that part of 
13 
the record. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ferretti, you have another 
document in front of you there called the Statement of 
D6f6ndu.rit. Have you had a chance to QO through that document 
with your attorney as well? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: This one goes over the same things that 
I just went over with you on the record, but you've had an 
opportunity to visit with your attorney about this case—or 
about this — or excuse me, this particular document? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: And is this your signature on the--on 
the back page? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, sir. 
MR. SWINK: Judge, we have one final request. The 
defendant has reviewed the document you have. Wefd ask the 
Court to sign that document and counsel for both the State and 
the defendant and the defendant as well. 
THE COURT: Counsel has already signed this document 
and it looks like the State has as well. 
Mr. Ferretti, I find that your guilty plea has been 
made freely and voluntarily and I hereby accept your guilty 
plea. To further document that, I'm signing off on the 
Statement of Defendant and entering that into the record at 
this time. 
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In addition to that, I'm also entering the Notice 
Plea Bargain, Rule 11 Waiver, Statement of Facts as well. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Judge, before we get ahead of 
ourselves. I think that he formally needs to--to enter gui 
on the record. I don't know that he actually--
THE COURT: Very well. Hold on one second. 
Actually, I need the copy, do you have the signed 
copy of the Notice of Plea Bargain? 
MR. SWINK: No. And thatfs--that's what I was 
requesting, your Honor, if we could sign that at this time. 
All parties. We have reviewed it, we have not all signed i 
THE COURT: Okay. Is this the only copy you have 
the one you gave to me? 
MR. SWINK: No. We have one more. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know if I made notes on 
so much as--yeah, I did make notes on it. 
MR. SWINK: We have a copy here, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Ferretti, while they're filling out those 
things, I'm going to ask you the question. To the charge o 
murder, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
76-5-203, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty? 
MR. FERRETTI: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. SWINK: Judge, we would also ask, after the 
15 
Court takes that plea, to give an oral factual basis to the 
charge as well (inaudible). 
Mr. Swink, would you like to do that? 
I J . I V . U V I I X I U V . j . v - iw> , y w v-i -u i i v i i u x < 
Judge, in addition to what the Court has reviewed 
with the defendant, the State would add to that that the 
defendant, after committing— 
THE COURT 
THE CLERK 
MR. SWINK 
Hold on. 
(Inaudible) by the mike, please. 
Is that working? Or do you want me to 
move to the microphone, your Honor? 
(Inaudible) 
Okay. 
Is that working? 
THE CLERK: 
MR. SWINK: 
THE COURT: 
Go ahead. 
MR. SWINK: In addition to what the Court reviewed 
with the defendant, your Honor, that somewhere between October 
and November of 2008, after having shot Tiffany Jarman in the 
head with a 9 millimeter handgun, the defendant, after 
disposing of her body, disposed or tried to get rid of the 
evidence in this case and after pursuing that course of 
action, admitted this incident to at least two other 
individuals, Robert Underwood in Colorado, he admitted that he 
shot Tiffany Jarman in the head and disposed of her body, and 
had also told him that he had mentioned this to another friend 
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of his. 
The State would also, if this were to have gone to 
trial, in addition to Mr. Underwood's testimony that the 
o^fonrianf "h^ r\ rrr\mc* +- r\ iri o horn0 in Color^d^ anrj had admitted to 
him the facts of this case, he further admitted to an inmate 
at the Cache County Jail the same facts in this case; that he 
had shot Ms. Jarman in the head, disposed of her body and 
tried to get rid of the evidence in this case. 
In addition to that, he also admitted to this inmate 
that he had told Robert Underwood and considered taking his 
life as well, since he had told him about the incident. 
Those would be the facts we would put forth at 
trial. 
THE COURT: All right. 
And Mr. Ferretti, as I've already gone over with you 
in the—in the Rule 11 Waiver and that Statement of Facts, 
you're entering your plea because those things actually 
occurred; is that correct? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Ferretti, you do have the right to be sentenced 
in no less than two or no more than 45 days. As I've stated 
to you earlier, you can waive that right if you do--if you 
want to and be sentenced today. By so waiving it, you're 
waiving your right to withdraw your plea. Do you understand 
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that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: And would you like to move forward with 
MR. FERRETTI: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's set—We need to set it for 
sentencing. 
THE CLERK: On a law and motion setting or a special 
setting? 
THE COURT: A special setting. 
THE CLERK: February 23rd at 9:00 a.m. 
MR. PERRY: That's not good for me. 
MR. SWINK: That would work fine for the State, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: It's—it's problematic for Mr. Perry. 
Come closer this way instead of — 
THE CLERK: February 10th, 9:30. 
MR. SWINK: Judge, the discussions I've had, A P & P 
is requesting eight weeks. They could do it as few as six 
weeks, that's the report that we've got from their office this 
morning. 
THE COURT: Well, it needs to be done within the 45 
days . 
MR. LINTON: They'll get—they'll get it done then. 
THE COURT: The 10th, fine? 
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It's less time than they would like, I know, but 
that's the time we're going to set it. 
All right. Is there anything else from either 
From the State? 
MR. SWINK: No, your Honor. Not at this time. 
THE COURT: Anything else you want me to go over? 
MR. SWINK: No. The Court's been thorough. Thank 
you, 
THE COURT: All right. 
Anything else from defense counsel? 
MR. GALLOWAY: How--how long did we set aside for 
the sentencing on that? Just out of curiosity. 
THE COURT: As long as you need. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Okay. So, we've got the morning or 
whatever we need? 
THE COURT: How much time did you set? 
THE CLERK: I've got — there is a 10:00 o'clock 
motion hearing, but I can move it. 
THE COURT: We—you can have the morning. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Very well. Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. FERRETTI: Your Honor, I would like to say that 
I never intended initially for Ms. Jarman to die and I 
apologize to the family and--and to the State for any troubles 
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that I've caused, and grief. 
THE COURT: Did you knowingly and intentionally take 
her life, Mr. Ferretti? 
MR, FERR.ETTI: I have trouble ss,rinrr u6S I did. I 
was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time and 
we were in an argument. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ferretti, I understand that, but by 
so stating and we've already gone over all this, but I'm going 
to go over it again, in order for me to accept your plea, I 
understand that you were under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol, but when you committed the act that you did by 
shooting her in the head, did you understand that that would 
be~-that you would be taking her life? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
All right. We'll continue to accept your plea. 
Anything else? 
MR. SWINK: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Thank you, Judge. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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Addendum C 
JAMES SWINK, 7998 
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
199 North Main Street 
Logan, Utah 84321 
TELEPHONE: (435) 755-1868 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT W. FERRETTI 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF PLEA BARGAIN 
RULE 11 WAIVER/STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
Case No. 
Judge Kevin Allen 
I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of, and that I understand the 
following facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of counsel in reviewing, explaining 
and completing this form: 
1. The nature of the charges against me have been explained. As explained, I am charged 
with the crime(s) in Cache County as follows: 
A. Murder, a First Degree Felony, 76-5-203 UCA, which is punishable pursuant to 
76-6-203 (3)(b), as follows: A person who is convicted of murder shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of noi less than 15 years and 
which may be for life. Further pursuant to UCA 76-3-301 a fine not exceeding 
$10,000 may be imposed by the judge. 
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a. The elements of this offense, pursuant to UCA 76-5-203 are that on 
or about October to November 2008, the defendant intentionally or 
knowingly cased the death of another, to wit, Tiffany B. Jarmon. 
B. Obstruction of Justice, a Second Degree Felony, 76-8-306, which is 
punishable pursuant to UCA 76-203 to a possible maximum sentence of 1 
to 15 years in prison, and pursuant to UCA 76-3-301 a fine not exceeding 
$10,000 may be imposed by the judge. 
a. The elements of this offense, pursuant to UCA 76-8-306(c) are that 
on or about October to November 2008, the defendant, with intent 
to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, 
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person regarding 
conduct that constitutes a criminal offense altered destroyed or 
concealed any item or thing. 
2. It has been discussed with the State that I will enter a plea of guilty as follows: 
One count of Murder 76-5-203 a first degree felony carrying the aforementioned 
sentences. 
3. I understand that the elements of the above offense the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt are that I intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another, Tiffany 
Britt Jarmon. 
4. I know that I can be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding, and I 
know that if I cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent me. I am being 
represented by Bryan Galloway and David Perry, Attorneys at Law. 
2 
5. I know that before I can be held to answer these charges, I have the right to a 
preliminary hearing. I understand that a preliminary hearing is designed to protect me 
from going to trial on the felony charges unless and until the State presents sufficient 
evidence, before a magistrate, to show probable cause that the crimes I am accused of were 
committed and that is probable cause to believe that I committed them. I realize that a 
preliminary hearing was conducted in this case and I was bound over to answer these 
charges. 
6. I understand that after my preliminary hearing. I can entered a plea of not guilty to the 
charges. Thereafter I had a right to a speedy jury trial. My trial was set for January 11, 
2009. 
7. I know also know that I have the right to plead not guilty, and I further know that if I 
do plead not guilty, I can persist in that plea. 
8. I know that I have a right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury, and that if I were 
to stand trial by a jury: 
a) I will be presumed innocent at my trial 
b) The right against self incrimination 
c) The right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury 
d) The right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution's 
witnesses 
e) The right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses 
f) I have a right to the assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceeding; 
g) I have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testify against me; 
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h) I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can obtain subpoenas to require the 
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay the witness 
and mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them; 
e) I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not have to testify at any trial; 
f) If I do not want to testify, the jury will be told that no inference adverse to me 
may be drawn from my failure to testify; 
g) The government must prove each and every element of the offense(s) charged 
against me beyond a reasonable doubt; 
h) A unanimous verdict of a jury is required to convict me; 
i) If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I cannot afford the cost of such an 
appeal, the government will pay the cost of the appeal, including the services of 
appointed counsel and I can take an appeal within 30 days from the final judgment 
of the court. 
9. I understand that by pleading guilty there will be no trial of any kind, and that I am 
admitting that I committed the crime as charged AND I AM WAIVING THESE RIGHTS 
WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT MY ATTORNEYS WILL ASSIST ME UNTIL THE 
CONCLUSION OF MY CASE BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT. 
11. I know, under the laws of Utah, the maximum sentence that can be imposed upon my 
plea of guilty to the charge identified on Page 1 of this Agreement. I also know that if I 
am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense for which I have 
been convicted or plead guilty, my plea in the present action can be used to revoke my 
probation or parole, and can result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me 
consistent with that revocation or any other pending criminal case for which I may be 
sentenced. 
13.1 know that under a plea of guilty the judge may ask me questions about the offense, 
and that I will have to admit my participation in committing the crime. 
14. The Agreement which has been entered into with the State is: 
A. The State will drop all pending counts in the information except Murder; 
B. The State agrees that sentencing can take place at the time of my plea is taken, 
and will move the Court to impose a sentence of incarceration in the Utah State 
Prison of 15 years to life. 
C. That in exchange the State will write a letter to the parole board with the 
following language: We would ask the Parole Board to consider the Defendant's 
willingness to plead guilty to murder as mitigation in considering his eventual 
release. 
D. The State will request the judge to make the same recommendation; however, I 
understand that the judge cannot be bound by any sentencing agreement between 
the parties. 
* * * * 
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The Factual Basis for My Guilty Plea is as follows: 
1, Sometime in the months of October to November, 2008,1 met with Tiffany Britt 
Jarmon. I had known Tiffany Britt Jarmon prior to this date: 
2. That during this time I took the life of Tiffany Britt Jarmon. I drove her to Cache 
County Utah, where I shot her in the head in my car, taking her life. I then pushed her body down 
an embankment next to the side of the road and fled. 
* * * * 
I make the following representations to the Court: 
1. That I am Hf years of age, and have completed fgh years of public school and 2 
year(s) of post high school education. I read and understand the English language. 
2. No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me to induce me or to persuade me 
to enter this plea other than the negotiations set forth in this document. 
3. No one has guaranteed me that I would receive any form of leniency because of my plea, 
and I understand that any recommendations made by the state may not be followed by the 
judge or the parole board. 
4. I understand that I may request to withdraw my guilty plea any time prior to sentencing or 
forfeit the right to do so. A motion to withdraw a guilty plea will only be granted upon 
good cause and is within the discretion of the Court. 
5. I have discussed this case and this plea with my attorneys as much as I wish to. I have no 
further questions of my lawyers prior to the Court's taking my plea. 
6. I am satisfied with my lawyer's counsel and advice. 
7. My decision to enter this plea was made after full and careful thought, with the advice of 
counsel, and with a full understanding of my rights, the facts and circumstances of the case 
and the consequences of the plea. I was not under the influences of any drugs, medication 
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea was made and I am not now under the 
influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants. 
8. I have no mental reservations concerning this plea. 
DATED this / / day of January, 2010. 
ROBERT FERRETTI 
Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for ROBERT FERRETTI, the Defendant above and that I 
know he has read the statement or that we have read it to him and I have discussed it with him and 
believe that he fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically 
competent to enter this plea. To the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations made 
by the Defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are accurate and true. 
DATED this _M_ day of January, 2010. 
DAVID PERRY y ^ 
Attorney for Defendant 
BRJAN GALLOWAY 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNTY ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against ROBERT FERETTI 
the Defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of the Defendant and find that the declaration, 
including the elements of the offense of the charge are true and correct. No improper 
inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered Defendant. The plea 
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the 
evidence would support the conviction of Defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered 
and acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest. 
DATED this / ^ day of January, 2010 
LMES SWINK 
Cache County Attorney 
ORDER 
The signature of the Defendant was acknowledged in the presence of the undersigned 
Judge. Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement By Defendant In Advance of Plea 
of guilty, the Court finds the Defendant's plea of guilty is free, knowingly and voluntarily made 
and it is so ordered that the Defendant's plea of guilty to the charge set forth in the Agreement be 
accepted and entered. 
DHXTF TKF mTJR T this ft day of Tama™ 2fi 10 vre^H^^H 
^ - • : - . ^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE X 
\^gSB^ 
Addendum D 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
Plaintiff, : AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
vs. _ : Case No. 
(tot (fexT 
Defendant. 
I, (jC^^^V i-^JL/^Tff hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised 
of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges t>v 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory Degree Punishment 
Provision Min/Max and/or 
$iTf\ / / / 5 ~ Minimum Mandatory^ 
A. / Ue$/iee nunoe^ J_ fs y/i^ -k /J^ 
A?,pip T^f l^? 
B. 
c. 
D. 
i 
9/0) 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. 1 have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which 1 am pleading guilty (or no contest)
 rare^ —^ 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing crimes). 
I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that the following 
facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These 
facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements 
of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest) 
I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might 
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service 
to me. 
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I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If] have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or no 
contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty 
(or no contest) plea(s). 
) D * C I) } ^ i / / c / 
J
 If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is ivftjh/ HA floutoi ) fi#SZ#y My 
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences w my guilty (or 
no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) 
jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
\J Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. 1 know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) my 
attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine 
all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those 
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have a 
jury trial, 1 would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose not to 
testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if 
I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
& Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or 
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that 1 am guilty of the charged crime(s). 
If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set 
for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that 
each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence and 
will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
1/ Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal 
my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime to 
which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a crime 
that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that 
crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that 1 may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the 
same time (concurrently). I know that 1 may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead 
to. 1 also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) 
plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am 
now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court 
to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive 
sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea bargain. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting.attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of 
the plea bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on 
the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may 
do are not binding on the judge. 
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Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises except 
those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
1 have read this statement, or 1 have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. 1 know that 1 am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am 7^years of age. I have attended school through the grade. I can read and 
understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided 
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which would impair 
my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, 
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
1 believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease, 
defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a written, 
motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced and final judgment has 
been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause. I will not be 
allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any reason. 
Dated this H day of J ^ i t & i A , 2QJQ 
Defendant 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for. _, the defendant above, 
and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have discussed it 
with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally 
and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate 
investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal 
conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made 
by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate arrf true. 
Attorne; 
Bar No. 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against / ^ c ^ T ^ 
Z?L*tsfL,f^T~-r / , defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that 
the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and 
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered 
defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea 
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe 
that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) 
is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serye^the public inte 
fecutmg Att<5rney 
Bar No. ~7 <? <? £? 
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Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the defendant 
and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses the signatures and 
finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
ITIS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (orno contest) plea(s) to the crime(s) 
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this IL day of. §r&k*t4 tCOssL ^2fo£r 
CT COURT JUDGE d 
%. ;.v" 
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Addendum E 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT WARREN FERRETTI, 
Defendant. ) 
-0O0-
Case No. 091100312 
SENTENCING 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 10th day of February, 
2010, commencing at the hour of 10:20 a.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE KEVIN K. 
ALLEN, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were 
had. 
-oOo-
D E P O M A X J M E R I 
= LITIGATION SERVICES 
3 3 3 SOUTH R I O G R A N D E 
S A L T LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
w w w DEPOMAXMERIT C O M 
TOLL F R E E 8 0 0 337-6629 
PHONE 801-328-1188 
FAX 801-328-1189 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the State: DONALD G. LINTON 
JAMIE M. SWINK 
Deputy Cache County 
District Attorneys 
199 North Main Street 
Third Floor 
Logan, Utah 84321 
For the Defendant: BRYAN P. GALLOWAY 
Attorney at Law 
76 West 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84325 
DAVID M. PERRY 
Attorney at Law 
14 West 100 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
* * * 
2 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Transcriber's Note: Speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
THE CLERK: State vs. Robert Warren Ferretti, Case 
No. 091100312. 
THE COURT: All right. This is the time set for 
sentencing. 
Mr. Galloway, Mr. Perry, are you ready? 
MR. GALLOWAY: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: The State ready? 
MR. SWINK: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Galloway, go ahead. 
MR. GALLOWAY: If I could have just one second? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Mr. Ferretti wanted to address the 
Court. 
THE COURT: Very well. Go ahead, Mr. Ferretti. 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, your Honor. At this time, I!d 
like to withdraw my guilty plea. 
THE COURT: Mr. Ferretti, that needs to be made in a 
motion, it needs to be articulated, the reasons set forth in 
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the motion. How much time do you think you need to visit with 
your attorneys to file that motion? 
MR. FERRETTI: Good question. 
A week or something, I'm—I'm guessing. 
THE COURT: How much time would you like? 
MR. GALLOWAY: I don't—I haven't researched the 
grounds for this plea, your Honor. I would ask for two weeks 
to do so; however, given the fact that he has 30 days from the 
date of entering that plea and we're right on the cusp of that 
at this time... 
THE COURT: It's 30 days or — 
MR. GALLOWAY: It is. And I —I'd make a verbal 
motion on his behalf at this time to toll that time period and 
then we would buttress that with—with a written motion, after 
we look into whether there are in fact grounds. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, the defendant has the 
right to make that motion and I'm going to accept the verbal— 
oral motion to withdraw to be followed up by written motion. 
Do you need two weeks? 
MR. GALLOWAY: I would say give us two weeks to look 
at it and file such motion as grounds warrant. 
THE COURT: The motion will need to be filed by 
February 25th. 
State's response will be due—is two weeks enough 
time for you to respond? Okay. So, the State's response will 
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be due on March 11th. 
And we111 set it for motion hearing, give us two 
hours, if you would, please. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Well, thatfs just the Friday right 
before the Monday, the Martinez trial starts. 
THE COURT: Oh, yeah. That!s not good. 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible) 
MR. GALLOWAY: I don't know, just a different--
THE COURT: I donft want it to sit out there for too 
long, so, go back, if you have to--
MR. GALLOWAY: How about the 19th or the 18th? 
THE COURT: What's the 23rd? 
MR. GALLOWAY: 17th? 
THE COURT: I know it's a civil day, but what's the 
23rd, afternoon, the 23rd? 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: The 23rd is Tuesday; right? 
Yeah. Civil law and motion, whatfs--is it full? 
THE CLERK: (Inaudible) 
THE COURT: Set it, I'll—that entire afternoon. 
So, the 23rd of March, Thurs--it's a Tuesday 
afternoon. 
Does that work for the State? 
MR. SWINK: It does, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Perry, does that work for you? 
Mr. Galloway? 
MR. GALLOWAY: Yes, Judge. 
THE COURT: All right. So, do we have the dates? 
MR. GALLOWAY: We do. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. GALLOWAY: Not at this time, Judge. 
THE COURT: From the State? 
MR. SWINK: Judge, I — I just would put on the record 
that we would like to move this along as quickly as possible. 
We appreciate the Court moving some things on your calendar. 
We do have the victim1s mother and sister who are here and 
they!ve come—one of them have come from out of State and it 
is a big inconvenience. 
THE COURT: I certainly understand that and 
hopefully, we can resolve this one way or the other rather 
quickly. 
Anything else, gentlemen? 
MR. LINTON: The only question I have, Judge, and 
it's my hearing, I didn't hear when their motion is due. 
THE COURT: Their motion is due — 
MR. GALLOWAY: 25th of February. 
THE COURT: --the 25th of February. 
MR. LINTON: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
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MR. GALLOWAY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. The Court's in recess. 
(Off the record) 
THE CLERK: State vs. Robert Warren Ferretti, Case 
No. 091100312. 
THE COURT: All right. We met in chambers 
previously. The State requested time to make a motion and so 
that's why we're back. 
MR. LINTON: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Mr. Linton? 
MR. LINTON: First of all, your Honor, in an attempt 
to try and find the gun so that it wouldn't fall into 
somebody's hands, perhaps even a child, I wrote a letter to 
Kim Scott. And in all candor, I--I guess it ended up in the 
pre-sentence report. 
I'm going to move—I've written numerous letters of 
this kind, I've never seen one in a pre-sentence report, so 
I'm going to move that it be stricken from the pre-sentence 
report. I think that was a mistake. 
Nonetheless, with that said--
THE COURT: Let's deal with that first, now, that 
you've made--you've made that. I'm sure you have no 
objections to that. 
MR. GALLOWAY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, the Court also read 
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that and frankly, was a little surprised that it was in there, 
not sure why it was. So, this is on Page 17 of the pre-
sentence report. I am going to order Adult Probation & Parole 
to strike that from the sentence—the pre — sentence report and— 
-are they here? 
MR. GALLOWAY: No. But we'll get with them. 
THE COURT: But they'll need to print off another 
one, removing that from the pre-sentence report and file the 
new and amended pre-sentence investigation report with the 
Court to--
MR. GALLOWAY: We'd also move the Court not to 
consider that letter. 
THE COURT: The Court did not consider that letter, 
frankly, I thought it was odd that it was in there to begin 
with. All right. 
MR. LINTON: We'd make a second motion, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Linton. 
MR. LINTON: We believe that under 77-13, and I 
don't have the full code, I think it's 13-8 or thereabouts--
THE COURT: 13-6. 
MR. LINTON: 13-6. There are two prerequisites that 
the defendant must show to withdraw his court (sic) . First, 
he needs leave of the Court and he must make a showing as to 
why his plea is not knowing and voluntary. 
We did an extensive Rule 11 waiver explaining to the 
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defendant his rights, what he was waiving. And we'd ask the 
Court to ask the defendant for a good faith basis on why he 
believes he has the right at this juncture to withdraw his 
plea and what the basis for that is. 
THE COURT: Mr. Galloway? 
MR. GALLOWAY: Judge, in thinking through Mr. 
Ferrettifs desires at this time, I think it's important — I 
understand that this was set for sentencing today, I 
understand people came from great distance, things such as 
that; however, I don't want to get in a rush and—and mess 
this thing up as we go along. 
Mr. Ferretti's expressed a desire to withdraw his 
guilty plea. He's not a legal expert, he doesn't have any 
legal training or anything such as that and so, actually, 
having him express the foundation for his desire to withdraw 
his guilty plea is something of a legal argument for which 
he's not trained. I think it would be a more prudent course 
to actually allow him, with the aid of counsel, to go through 
all the documentation that was signed on the date the plea was 
entered, to actually review all of the information, including 
the — the transcript and the record on that date and establish 
grounds, if any in fact do exist. But I think that puts Mr. 
Ferretti almost in a position to make a legal argument for 
which he's not trained at this time. 
MR. LINTON: We have no objection for Mr. Galloway 
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to make that basis, 
MR. GALLOWAY: I—I, quite frankly, haven't had the 
time to go through that, and I--in all candor, in speaking 
with him, I'm not exactly sure what the foundation of that 
argument would be with regards to withdrawing his guilty plea. 
We spoke briefly, for ten minutes, in the holding cell about 
the foundation and the legal requirements that are needed to 
make that withdrawal of plea and I kind of explained to him 
what needed to happen. He did have some concerns about him 
entering the plea, about how the plea was—was treated, about 
information that's come up since the plea was entered. But at 
this time, I'm not prepared to argue a motion to withdraw the 
plea, but I do think it would be a more prudent course of 
action to allow him time, with the aid of counsel, to prepare 
a formal motion, if, in fact, one is warranted in this case. 
MR. LINTON: Therein lies the big issue, your Honor. 
We object. We don't believe there is any good faith reason 
for him to withdraw his plea. We've got all of the documents 
right here. We--the Court knows how careful we were that day 
in terms of going over the Rule 11 colloquy and that's what 
we're talking about right now, we're talking about his Rule 11 
waivers. I have them here. His rights were explained to him. 
He will not be able to find a right that was not given to him 
and that's why he, at this juncture, cannot make a good faith 
reason why he met those two criteria, one, with leave of the 
10 
Court and why his plea was not knowing and voluntary. 
And so we object in a continuing sense. We donft 
think there is even a prima facie, good faith reason for him 
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one. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
All right. The State is correct and—and I do 
appreciate your arguments, Mr. Galloway. I understand the 
frustration that you feel in trying to assist your client, 
given the fact that you just found out this morning, 
apparently, as he was articulating to us that he wanted to 
withdraw his plea. 
Therefore, what I'm going to do is — is, at least, 
require Mr. Ferretti to give me a good faith basis on which he 
is withdrawing his plea, by telling me in some way or another 
and then if — if it rises even to a level of a good faith 
basis, then we'll go with the times that we've previously 
discussed this morning and—to allow you more time to address 
this on a legal basis. 
But the —either he has—either he has a good faith 
basis to show that his plea was not made knowingly and 
voluntarily or he doesn't. If he does, then I'll certainly 
allow the defense time to move forward and flesh it out and 
put it into more legal format, but certainly, without even the 
basis of that, I'm not going to proceed. 
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So, Mr. Ferretti, I need to understand— 
MR. GALLOWAY: Judge, can I have just one second 
before the Court--
rpUT? rr\TlT>T . r ^ ^ - h o n ' m l r r 
(Inaudible off-the-record discussion) 
MR. GALLOWAY: Judge, I should make a point that 
counsel, other counsel for defense is not here at this time. 
I think Mr. Ferretti and I feel comfortable going forward 
today with this hearing; is that correct? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Okay. 
If I could have just one second to talk to him? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
(Inaudible off-the-record discussion) 
MR. GALLOWAY: Very well. 
THE COURT: All right. 
So, Mr. Ferretti, Ifm going to ask you to articulate 
for the record why it is that you feel that your plea was not 
made knowingly and voluntarily. 
MR. FERRETTI: During the course of--of reading--I— 
I can articulate this as best as I can— 
THE COURT: And--and that's all I expect. 
MR. FERRETTI: —without any legal knowledge. 
THE COURT: Just do your best. 
MR. FERRETTI: But reading the paperwork was getting 
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changed while I was--I was sitting there and it was-the 
wording was changed to where I did not knowingly or 
intentionally cause the death of this girl. I signed that. 
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that it was knowingly and I may have misunderstood between 
those two, but I did not intentionally cause the death of this 
girl. And that, I will argue !til my day--'til the end. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. FERRETTI: I do admit that I—I covered 
evidence, Ifve--Ifve made a lot of mistakes in this, but I did 
not intentionally cause the death of this girl. 
MR. LINTON: Your Honor, if it please the Court, may 
I approach? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
MR. LINTON: I'll show defense counsel. 
MR. FERRETTI: Your Honor, I have a question while 
we're here waiting. 
THE COURT: Hold on one second. 
Ask your attorney first before you ask me. 
(Inaudible off-the-record discussion) 
MR. LINTON: Your Honor, this is a plea colloquy 
that was prepared by the State that also the Court remembers, 
read by your Honor to the defendant. And so if I can approach 
and show you Paragraph 3 right here, which has been shown to 
the defendant. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Ferretti, I have —I'm looking at the 
record of this Rule 11 waiver that we went over you with. Do 
you remember that? I went over that with you in Court, went 
over every single paragraph and I read it to you. Do you 
remember that? 
MR. FERRETTI: Vaguely, sir. 
THE COURT: And I read to you the Paragraph 3, it 
says, I understand that the elements of the above offense the 
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that I 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another, 
Tiffany Brit Jarman, and to that, you said yes, you understood 
that and agreed with that paragraph when you entered your sen-
-when you entered your plea. 
So, what—help me understand why now youf re saying 
that you didn't do that. 
MR. FERRETTI: I really don't know how to explain 
it, but beyond—they have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that I intentionally did that and I--I didn't—maybe I didn't 
fully understand, but I am stating at this time I did not 
intentionally and/or knowingly cause the death of this girl. 
THE COURT: But at the time you entered your plea, 
you said you did; correct? 
MR. FERRETTI: Apparently so. 
THE COURT: I also went over Paragraph 1, where I 
read to you the definition of murder. Murder, a first-degree 
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felony, and what the possible sentence would be for that. Do 
you remember that? 
Murder, a first-degree murder, it's on the very 
first page, it!s one of the very first things I went over with 
you. And you answered yes, you understood that. 
MR. FERRETTI: I vaguely remember that, yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I asked you if you were on drugs that 
day and you said no. 
Were you on drugs that day? 
MR. FERRETTI: No. 
THE COURT: Did you consume any alcohol that day? 
MR. FERRETTI: Nope. 
THE COURT: You stated earlier to me, just a few 
minutes ago, that—that this document that you signed was 
changed as you were—as you were sitting there. What was 
changed? 
MR. FERRETTI: The wording of—I'm—and ITm not 
exactly sure what part. ITd have to look at it again. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GALLOWAY: Judge, there's a document that had 
the statement of facts in it and some of the facts got 
changed, I believe. 
MR. LINTON: HereTs the other document. It says, As 
stated in Court. That's the--the only thing (inaudible) 
Judge, I'll put on the record here and defense 
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counsel can correct me if I'm wrong, but the only thing that 
was changed in that agreement was that the State would agree 
to write a letter to the Board of Pardons, telling them of his 
cooperation and—and let--yeah. And we —and we had stricken 
one other matter, but let me refer to it in the document 
itself. 
It was Sub (d) that we added to the agreement, and 
it said, The State will request the Judge to make the —it's 
actually Paragraph (c) of 14 on Page 5 of this agreement. And 
it says that in exchange, the State will write a letter to the 
parole board with the following language, and—and we added 
this language. We already had in the agreement that we would 
write a letter to the parole board, but they wanted specific 
language included, which they went over with their client and 
it says this: We would ask the parole board to consider the 
defendant's willingness to plead guilty to murder as 
mitigation in considering his eventual release. That was what 
was added. 
We did strike Paragraph 10 which was, I understand 
that by pleading guilty, there will be no appellate review of 
any lawful sentence imposed. And we all initialed that, that 
was the only other matter stricken. 
THE COURT: So, Mr. Ferretti, turn to Page 5 of that 
document. See that? Are you there? 
MR. FERRETTI: It's a different one. 
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THE COURT: Yeah, a different one. 
Okay. Do you see that? 
Apparently, there were some discussions--
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MR. FERRETTI: Yes, sir. I'm— 
THE COURT: Apparently, there were some discussions 
previous to me even coming out on the bench regarding the—the 
terms of this plea, but this, the document that you have there 
in front of you, was presented to the Court as a full 
understanding of the terms of your plea. 
And I went over that on Page 5. Now, you can go 
ahead and take a look at it, at Paragraph (c), this is all 
that I had and this is what was presented to the Court after 
you signed it. And this is the paragraph that I went over 
with you in open court. And I read this paragraph to you. 
Are you unhappy with the — the letter? Or is it Mr. 
Lintonfs letter that was in the pre-sentence report? What is 
it that you!re unhappy with, about that paragraph? 
MR. FERRETTI: I don't—I donft think I have any 
problem with this paragraph here. 
THE COURT: Okay. So, is it you're saying that some 
of this was changed? That's what I'm trying to figure out. 
Is this what you agreed to with your attorney, with 
the State, in exchange for entering the plea that the charge-
one of the charges would be dropped and that they would write 
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a letter to the parole board; is that what you agreed to? 
MR. FERRETTI: I believe that is what I agreed to, 
but what I!m--what I!m trying to say, your Honor, is, I did 
not intentionally cause the death of this girl. I may have 
entered into this agreement not fully understanding what it 
was, but at this time, I would like to state that I did not 
intentionally do that and I--I would wish to have that proved 
at a jury trial. 
THE COURT: Okay. Just so—and I--I understand what 
youfre saying, but just so Ifm clear, is it--as it relates to 
this Notice of Plea Bargain, Rule 11 Waiver, Statement of 
Facts, and then also, you were looking at the other one called 
The Statement of Defendant in Support of a Guilty Plea; did 
you see that one, too? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Just so I'm clear. You--there's 
nothing in these two documents that you're stating was changed 
and that you didn't agree to at the time you entered your 
plea? 
MR. FERRETTI: Not that I could see at this time. 
THE COURT: Okay. Have you had enough time to look 
through those documents? 
Take your time. 
So, Mr. Ferretti, you've had an opportunity to go 
through both those documents. Is there anything in there that 
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you think was changed or you didn't read through or that I 
didn't talk to you about at the time I took your plea? 
MR. FERRETTI: I don!t believe so, your Honor. 
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I have for you. When I went through and read this document to 
you, every paragraph and after every paragraph, I asked you if 
that was true and you said yes, including on Page 2, the 
elements of this offense are that on or about October or 
November, the defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the 
death of another, to-wit: Tiffany Jarman. 
Do you see that at the very top? 
And on that day, you said yes, that is true; 
correct? 
On the day you entered your plea? 
MR. FERRETTI: I'm assuming that I did say that is 
correct if—if you said it, I don't remember saying that, 
naturally, but--
THE COURT: Okay. Well, if I —if I told you that 
you did say yes, you'd believe me? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yeah. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
So, then, we've already gone over Paragraph 3. So, 
turn to Page 6. 
The very top, it says The factual basis for my 
guilty plea is as follows, and I read this to you: Some time 
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in the months of October or November, 2008, I met with Tiffany 
Brit Jarman. I had known Tiffany Brit Jarman prior to this 
date. 
At the time, you said yes, thatfs correct. Do you 
have any reason to believe you said something differently that 
day? 
MR. FERRETTI: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Then on No. 2, Paragraph 2, That 
during this time, I took the life of Tiffany Brit Jarman. I 
took her to Cache County, Utah, where I shot her in the head, 
in my car, taking her life. I then pushed her body down an 
embankment next to the side of the road and fled. 
I asked you whether or not you did in fact do that 
that day and you told me yes. Isn't that correct as well? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. And the last question I have for 
you and--and I remember, and this isn't in the written record 
but I remember it very clearly, I asked you if you had 
anything else that you wanted to say, at the very end. And 
you said that you did and you apologized for what had happened 
and said that you felt bad about it, you apologized to the 
family and then you said something like, I didn't mean to. 
And then I asked you, Nevertheless, Mr. Ferretti,--
and I'm paraphrasing, but I'm pretty sure this is what I said, 
Nevertheless, Mr. Ferretti, when you put the gun to her head 
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and you pulled the trigger, did you know that it would kill 
her? And you said yes. Do you remember that? It's the very 
last thing we talked about. 
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THE COURT: Would you believe me if I told you 
that's what you told me when I asked you that question? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes. I would. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Can I get my copy back of that, please? Or the 
Court--the Court's copy of the record. 
Do I have anything of yours, Mr. Galloway? Any 
documents? I want to make sure I have--
MR. GALLOWAY: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else from 
the State? 
MR. LINTON: We'd ask the Court not to grant leave 
at this time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Galloway, anything else? 
MR. GALLOWAY: I'd just reiterate my previous-
previous motion. 
THE COURT: All right. Noting the defense's 
objection and motion, I'm going to deny that. I find that Mr. 
Ferretti has not been able to articulate a good faith basis as 
to why his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made at the 
time. 
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Mr. Ferretti, I understand that thereTs always 
regrets, especially when you enter a plea to something as 
serious as this, but at the time you entered your plea, it was 
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and after our discussion today, even though I--it's clear you 
don't--you regret making the plea, itfs clear to me that you 
made it knowingly and voluntarily. And that is the benchmark 
before we proceed any further under Utah Code 77-13-6 as to 
whether or not you can withdraw your plea. 
Your plea, having been made knowingly and 
voluntarily, the find--and I made that finding at the time you 
entered it and I!m making it again today, that there 's no 
basis whatsoever for you to show that it was not made 
knowingly and voluntarily, you were feeling well, you hadn!t 
consumed any drugs or alcohol, youfd had time to talk about it 
with your attorney. I read every single sentence to you in 
the—those documents and you agreed at the time. The fact 
that you don't want to do that anymore is not necessarily a 
legal basis on which you can withdraw your plea. 
So, the motion to withdraw your plea is denied and 
we'll proceed with sentencing. 
Do you need more time to prepare, like do you need 
a— 
MR. GALLOWAY: No. I'm prepared for sentencing, 
Judge, the one thing I would note is, I know Mr. Perry was 
22 
prepared to make a few comments at sentencing, he!s not here 
at this time. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He!s on his way back up right 
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THE COURT: All right. We--
MR. GALLOWAY: Additionally, due to kind of how this 
has proceeded today, wherein, which we had the sentencing set 
for 9:30 and then we came in and Mr. Ferretti made his motion 
and then there was a time period between, I know that Mr. 
Ferretti had some individuals here in the courtroom that were 
here to support him in the sentencing and then, they, in fact, 
are not aware that the sentencing is taking place right now. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GALLOWAY: And so, I do have some concerns that 
those individuals did want to be here at that time. 
THE COURT: What?s the possibility of tracking down 
those people? 
MR. GALLOWAY: I donft know, honestly. 
THE COURT: Do you know, Mr. Ferretti? 
MR. FERRETTI: I do not. 
MR. LINTON: Your Honor, the only Constitutional 
right to speak at a sentencing like this belongs to the victim 
and her family. Mr. Ferretti might want to have some people 
here, but by his own doing is the cause that theyTre not here 
and so, I'd ask that we go ahead and move forward. 
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THE COURT: I understand that. 
Nevertheless, I want to be as fair to Mr. Ferretti 
as possible. I'm going to give counsel ten minutes to just 
discuss this before we proceed, see if there's anything else 
that you want to put together before the Court, to see if you 
can contact those individuals and let the Court know as to the 
status of whether or not they're going to be here or not 
within a short time. 
So, we'll be back here at ten to 12:00. Court's in 
recess . 
(Recess) 
THE COURT: All right. I understand that some of 
your parties have been found, Mr. Ferretti? Is that your 
understanding as well? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And they're returning. Okay. 
Before we proceed, I do want to make it clear for 
the record that I'm not making the ruling I did earlier 
because of anything other than I found that it was not 
knowingly — that Mr. Ferretti's plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily made. Some concerns were raised in chambers 
regarding the victim's family having traveled far and in 
chambers, I told the prosecution that I'm not considering 
that, that's not a part of what I'm considering and for the 
record, I'm saying the same thing. That is not part of what 
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I'm considering, it's not part of the ruling I made today. 
So, now, we're set for sentencing. 
Mr. Perry? 
MR. PERRY: Your Honor, I'd make a motion to 
continue sentencing at this time. I think it's the intent of 
Mr. Ferretti to file an interlocutory appeal of your recent 
motion and on the basis that he wasn't given due process under 
the, at least the Sixth Amendment, effective right of — of 
counsel. He lets us know ten minutes prior to sentencing that 
he wants to withdraw his plea and initially, the Court gave us 
time, until February 25th to file a motion to withdraw the 
plea, which would have given us an opportunity to review; but 
under the rules of appellate procedure, we'd ask the Court to 
continue sentencing so that we can file our petition for 
interlocutory appeal and see if the Supreme Court will hear 
this —our argument on giving Mr. Ferretti the opportunity to 
file a written motion and—and argue, after counsel has had 
adequate time to prepare, review the record and—and make 
meaningful arguments to the Court as to what grounds he may be 
proceeding under to withdraw his plea. 
And so, we'd ask for a continuance of the sentencing 
on those grounds, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Your motion for continuance 
is denied. 
MR. PERRY: Okay. Your Honor, in this case, Mr. 
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Ferretti—what! s that? 
In this case, Mr. Ferretti has set forth in his 
statement the events that occurred, you know, on that night 
and then he!s also indicated that there's a lot of things he 
can't remember and maybe that shows—puts red flags in the 
Court's eyes or maybe the State's eyes or if you—if the Court 
reviewed the (inaudible) medical records, and I presume the 
Court has— 
THE COURT: Uh huh (affirmative). 
MR. PERRY: --and in this matter, in—in one note, 
it says, patient reports periods of time when he cannot 
remember anything. And underneath that, it says other 
negative consequences related to substance abuse. 
And so, that—he's admitted that — in his statement 
that on the night in question, both people used 
methamphetamine. When he was in the hospital, he reports to 
the doctor there that there's times when he cannot remember 
anything and so that may explain, you know, why his statement 
is vague and address some of the concerns that the Deputy 
County Attorney has about location of the firearm or whatnot. 
Anyway, we'd just urge the Court to, you know, 
enforce the plea agreement. The State agreed to write a 
letter to the Board and recommend that they consider the fact 
that he pled guilty as a mitigating factor in determining when 
his release from prison will be. 
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Also, farther, we'd--also, your Honor, wefd point 
out that therefs been statements made in the report that, 
especially like a Grace Brownley, when he was living there, he 
provided care to her husband who was in a wheelchair. She 
indicated she never noticed anything violent about him. 
In my associations with Mr. Ferretti, he's been very 
cordial every time I've met with him, he doesn't have any 
write-ups at the jail, he just seems to be, you know, a non-
violent person. 
And so, we'd ask the Court to factor all that in 
consideration in passing sentence. I'd submit it on that. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Ferretti, is there anything you want to say? 
MR. FERRETTI: Yes, your Honor. When this was first 
proceeding, I requested that the Court or that my attorneys, 
investigator or whoever, obtain medical records from my 
initial doctor, my--for my initial heart attack and those were 
never acquired. I don't understand why that is. I know how 
medical records go with getting that stuff from them, but I 
just received a letter from my ex-girlfriend, last night, and 
she mentioned some things in there that would possibly be 
relevant to this case as far as my--my mental state goes. 
And I would--I just wanted to say that. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can articulate what those 
con--those mental state concerns were, if you would like, to 
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me. You donft need your girlfriend to do that, if you want to 
do that. 
MR. FERRETTI: Well, it actually—it would actually 
come from the--from the doctor, but his--I don't fully 
understand. It's something to do with I came out of a coma 
when — and they had to re-induce a coma and that had something 
to do with schizophrenia and various other things that could 
occur because of that. 
I've had trouble with these different things, 
anxiety, schizophrenia, hearing voices and stuff over the 
years and at some time — it comes and goes. I'm not trying to 
use this as an excuse for what happened, of course, but I just 
want the Court to be aware of my situation. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Ferretti. 
MR. FERRETTI: And I was also — the copy of the 
P.S.I, report was given to me and I did read some stuff that 
apparently was not supposed to be in there. I didn't feel 
very good about some of those things that I read in there and 
I don't believe that that should be addressed like that. I 
understand things are privately, but apparently, everybody is 
under the belief that I am just joking with you guys about 
this and nobody seems to believe my story that I am not just 
some cold-blooded killer. 
And I hope this is being recorded so that people can 
understand how I feel about this. And as I stated before, I 
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understand that I may have made a mistake as far as this--
entering this guilty plea. I also thought that I would be 
able to retract that guilty plea because I was not, at that 
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have all the evidence available and the things for my proper 
defense. 
THE COURT: Is that because you didn't get the 
medical records? 
MR. FERRETTI: The medical records and another issue 
also. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
Anything else, Mr. Ferretti? 
MR. FERRETTI: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LINTON: Judge, first of all, I—would the Court 
mind if I sat while I went through--
THE COURT: So long as we can pick you up, so make 
sure you don't cover up the microphone and you speak into it. 
MR. LINTON: Judge, first of all, in response to the 
defendant's assertions that the Court has seen the pre-
sentence report which contains a number of diagnoses from 
individuals who were professionals in Colorado. 
I'll draw your attention to some of those diagnoses, 
which were never schizophrenic in nature, but they were drug-
induced psychosis and he was also diagnosed with 
29 
methamphetamine dependence. 
There was a psychosis, this is on another report 
submitted by Timothy W. Woodward, who is a medical doctor who 
diagnosed him with psychosis not otherwise specified, 
probable--probable drug-induced psychosis and methamphetamine 
dependence and also alcohol abuse, ruling out bipolar disorder 
in that same, and both of these were subsequent to the 
defendant's heart attack. 
With that said, Judge, IT11 also refer the Court too 
76-5-205.5 of the Utah State Code and this is relevant in this 
case for this reason— 
THE COURT: I!m sorry. What's the Code section 
again? 
MR. LINTON: 76-5-205.5. 
A defendant cannot use that as a defense in this 
instance because he voluntarily ingested methamphetamine and 
alcohol, by his own admission, on this occasion and he's 
attributing that to blacking out or—or—or some other reason; 
but that section reads, the defendant, who is under the 
influence of voluntarily consumed, injected or ingested 
alcohol, controlled substances or volatile substances at the 
time of the alleged offense may not claim mitigation of the 
offense on the basis of a mental illness if the alcohol or 
substance caused, triggered or substantially contributed to 
the mental illness. 
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Wefd just submit to the Court in this instance that 
even if the defendant is trying to rely on this mental illness 
or disturbance or this drug-induced state that he could not 
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Furthermore, Judge, the facts do not weigh that out; 
in fact, the facts in this case indicate the defendant has a 
very good recollection of what occurred and I111 draw the 
Court's attention, first of all, to the statement in the pre-
sentence report on Page 20 and 21. 
The defendant, in clear detail, talked to his 
friend, Robert Underwood, about this event and he did so on a 
couple of different occasions. The defendant's friendship 
with Rob--Mr. Underwood goes back some time and you will 
recall, in the preliminary hearing, when Mr. Underwood 
testified and it's also in the pre-sentence report, that the 
defendant called him at his home and he told him that he had 
done what they had talked about during a barbecue and that is 
taking someone up into the mountains and shooting them to see 
if they could do it. 
He admitted at that time that he goofed up and it 
was just, he thought, with this friend, it was just something 
they talked about, but it would never, ever happen and he said 
that this was just something to talk about when we were 
drinking. Well, he told me that he had done this, but he 
messed it up. He also told me that it didn't bother him at 
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all. 
The defendant is a dangerous individual and this is 
(inaudible) by the facts of this case as well. He remembers 
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can help him out; one, his friend, Mr. Underwood in Colorado, 
and another person, and I'll come back to this in just a 
minute, Mr. Nathan Duros, in the Cache County Jail, where he 
gives explicit details regarding this event. 
He told him at that time that he was going to go out 
of the country. Later, and this is on Page 21, your Honor, 
the defendant re-contacts his friend, Mr. Underwood, and Mr. 
Underwood had tried to find out who had died over here in Utah 
and was not able to do that by looking on line, but the 
defendant ends up going to his home, they end up having some 
alcohol, they drink some alcohol, heTs with him for some time 
and then he opens up one evening and this is what's reported 
by Mr. Underwood. 
This is the night that Rob started to tell me what 
happened. He hadn't told me who he had shot, but he said that 
he was to take somewhere--he was--and I'll — I'm just going to 
read it as it's written although it doesn't read very well, 
but he said that he was take them somewhere to shoot the 
person. He said that he didn't make it to where he planned to 
do it because the person would not shut up. 
He said he got tired of hear their mouth and just 
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shot them right in the front seat. He said he laughed and 
said, oh, what, ainft you got nothing to say now? And I told 
him that I had been checking the web site for the Tribune and 
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So, he asked me to show him the web site and when I 
got on it and clicked on homicide for 2008, and showed me 
Tiffany's name, there was--there was no picture. He clicked 
on her name and I read the report and things started to change 
real fast. I couldn!t believe this was happening. I told 
that back when we talked about doing something like this, that 
it was someone that we never knew and now it was someone that 
I knew. I asked him if he could take it back, would he do so? 
And he said no, that if he hadn?t done it, someone else would 
have. This is when I saw things for what they were. 
As we continue down through that paragraph, Mr. 
Underwood now starts to express some concern about the 
defendant and--and him harming other individuals and he said 
this: He told me about some Mexican friend of his, that they 
were talking about him shooting her to shut her up and 
laughing, saying, oh, what, you ain't got nothing to say now? 
And how it didn't bother him in the least and that he hadn't 
lost any sleep over it. 
He goes on to say that the cops tried to question 
him over at his house and he had his best poker face on and--
and Mr. Underwood goes on to say that this started to scare 
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him and he started to feel trepidation about being around the 
defendant and he was fearing for his own safety. 
Now, Judge, that!s important, again, to show how 
v^angerous Luis e^±.envaant is. »\s Know tust tac ucj.snuant/ snu 
if you'll look on Page 8 of the pre-sentence report, that the 
defendant also talked to Nathan Duros. And these are 
individuals who did not know the facts about this case and Mr. 
Duros had no way of knowing any of the facts about this case. 
He reported to police, after he was—found out what 
had happened, from the defendant, having been housed with him, 
that the victim and the defendant had been using drugs 
together and that he shot her, in the vehicle. 
And that's also supported and corroborated by the 
facts of this case. There was a large amount of blood found 
in the vehicle, in the passenger side of the vehicle, that the 
blood had accumulated on the floor board. We know that a 
piece of the carpet was ripped up in that vehicle, that there 
was so much blood that when it was tested by the State Crime 
Lab, they could see how it had pooled on the floor underneath 
the carpet. 
We also know that it had run down the console, had 
run over the console and down onto the driver's side part of 
the console. The defendant had tried to clean that up, he had 
tried to wipe down the vehicle, he had removed the passenger 
side seat in addition to the carpet and the defendant went to 
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great lengths to try to cover up the evidence in this case; 
again, because he knew, Judge, that he had murdered someone, 
he knew how he had done it. He has admitted to two 
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event went down. He didnft shoot her outside the car, he 
ended up shooting her inside of the car. 
He admitted to—and the defendant, Judge, seems and-
-and if you read his report of the events, he tries to blame 
other people and sadly enough and deplorably enough, he tries 
to blame the victim in this instance. 
He reports to Duros that she was crying when he shot 
her. He said Robert claimed she deserved to die because she 
was a crack whore. 
He said she was poor and on drugs and then he talked 
about how he drove to Logan and discarded the body in Logan 
Canyon and later, threw the gun away in the lower part of the 
canyon. 
He admitted that they had had sex, but he denied 
having raped her. 
According to Mr. Duros, Robert told him to consult 
with his brother about how to discard the evidence; so, he not 
only discarded the evidence, but he talked about, to someone 
else he referred to as his brother, of what he should do to 
discard the evidence. 
Mr. Duros also reported and this is the concern and 
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this is Mr. Underwood's concern, that he was afraid and began 
to be afraid for his own safety, which is real, because Mr. 
Duros reported to law enforcement and this is in the pre-
sentence report, that he also had thoughts about killing Mr. 
Underwood because he had told him about the events. 
Again, your Honor, that goes to the defendant's 
dangerousness and—and another thing that shows how dangerous 
the defendant is, is the lack of remorse that he shows in this 
instance. 
On Page 3 of the pre-sentence report, Mr. Scott 
reports that he verbalizes remorse, but there is a clear 
absence of matching emotion. His statements are without 
feeling. 
Just down on that page, the defendant wants to blame 
other people and when he says things like this, it really goes 
to how dangerous the defendant is and that he can't take 
responsibility and wants to blame the victim in this case for 
his acts. 
He says the type--when asked what changes he needed 
to make so this doesn't happen again, he stated, the types of 
women I date. He said he is a kind person that tries to save 
girls. 
And down below, he says he does not think his 
account of that--of the event will be completely understood 
and he also says, the evidence points only one way; and it 
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really does, your Honor. But for a comprehensive 
investigation by the Cache County Sheriff!s Office and a 
little bit of luck in that the defendant, as he was trying to 
discard and get rid of the evidence, his vehicle was not 
crushed and we were able to find the vehicle, which supported 
the other evidence that had been accumulated by the County 
Sheriff!s Office. 
The defendant could have walked. He did everything 
he could to dispose of the evidence because he knew that he 
had shot Tiffany Jarman in the head and caused her death. 
Judge, I know the Court has read the pre-sentence 
report. We would submit to this Court and ask the Court to 
sentence the defendant according to Section 76-5-203 Sub (3) 
to 15 years to life in the Utah State Prison as the facts of 
this case support such a sentence and the State law requires 
such. We!d ask the Court to enter such sentence at this time. 
THE COURT: Do you have anyone else that you want to 
present? 
MR. LINTON: Judge, we do have the mother of the 
victim, Becky—Becky Jarman, and she would address the Court 
first, after which the sister of the victim, Tricia Jarman, 
would like to address the Court as well. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Ferretti, go ahead and have a seat over in the 
jury box, please. 
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MS. JARMAN: Tiffany Brit Jarman was 33 years old, 
she was funny, loving, caring and giving, but she was so much 
more; she was a mother, a sister, a cousin, a niece and a 
friend, but more important, she was my baby. 
What Robert Ferretti did is reprehensible. He made 
a choice that night, but not the right one. He drove Tiffany 
up a canyon in Logan, ended her life and left her by the side 
of a road. 
It sickens me to be in the same room with him. He!s 
a coward. I can't phantom what kind of a person, especially 
one who had known my daughter for several years and fathered a 
child with her, what do you say about a man like this? I say 
he's not the kind of person I want in my world or our society. 
I don't want another mother to ever run the risk of having to 
go through the heartache and pain that I've had to endure. 
The only solace this Court could offer me today is 
to promise that Mr. Ferretti will spend the rest of his life 
in prison. He took my baby, but not my memories. I have a 
daughter, still, but I have half a heart, that I will still 
feel those memories, but I never feel my daughter's arms 
around me, (inaudible) me, see that smile and hear her laugh 
and have her Thisper in my ear, I love you, Mother. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. JARMAN: Thank you. 
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First of all, I want to say, no human being should 
ever be standing where I am right now, standing in front of 
her baby sisterfs murderer, her only sibling that is. 
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sister. Tiffany was and is sunshine, always smiling, happy, a 
kind, tender hearted little girl. She was funny, outgoing, 
loved her children and family. She only wanted to be--only to 
love and to be loved. 
You, you coward, took that away. You are a monster, 
a murderer and did I mention coward? 
This trauma you intentionally brought into our lives 
is way beyond the realm of the normal, human experience and 
has turned all our lives upside down and that is an under-
statement. We will never fully recover from this tragedy, no 
matter how much time goes by. You affected our lives in many 
more ways than I can possibly ever count nor explain; mine, my 
step-father, Tiffany's friends, countless cousins, uncles, 
aunts, my mom's and her children and one of those children, 
one of the children that you and Tiffany had together, I don't 
think any excuse may be given to your son that you and Tiffany 
had together will ever appease him. 
You shot her in the head and you dumped her body on 
the side of a canyon road. It is normal for children to bury 
their parents, to watch their children go on, lead their own 
lives, that is a normal and joyous part of life, to walk 
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through your life with your siblings, and in my case, my only 
sibling, my baby sister, Tiffany Brit Jarman. 
I should be sitting on a front porch with my sister, 
in old age, laugh and talk and share together the experiences 
we shared together through the course of our lives. My mom 
had to bring my sister, my baby sister, Tiffany Brit Jarman, 
home in a box. We never had the regular rituals that normal 
human beings get to do when someone in their lives died; no 
viewing, no funeral, no burial. 
No matter—no mother should ever have to do that, 
let alone outlive her baby daughter. For that, I cannot and I 
will not forgive you. 
I can only say at this point that I wish and hope 
and pray that you will spend the rest of your natural life in 
prison, for as long as I!m alive, I will be at every parole 
board meeting, Tcause I will out-live you and so will her 
children, they will be there as well. You will never be 
released into society as long as I!m alive. 
You may be able to try and shut my sister up, bur I 
think the only voice that you won't be able to shut up is the 
walls — or the voice that you will hear in the four walls that 
you will be confined to and those walls will hear the echoes 
of your screams and your cries. 
Ifm done. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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Is there anything else from the State? 
Is there anything else from the State? 
MR. LINTON: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Perry, is the witness—the person 
that came, did you want them to have — to be able to say 
something? 
MR. PERRY: I guess they--she's not going to make a 
statement. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PERRY: She—she's previously written a letter 
and so I guess we'll just submit it on that letter. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Ferretti, come on up. 
Mr. Perry, is there anything else today? 
MR. PERRY: Well, we could go on about the 
statements about Nathan Duros, about how he's a professional, 
I guess, narc, so to speak, he's—he's just trying to—he's 
narced on people down in Tooele and Davis County, a couple 
people in the Cache County jail, and then as a Federal inmate, 
has made a living out of--out of trying to provide 
information. And so whatever reliability his statement has, I 
guess the Court can weigh that, 
Obviously, Mr. Ferretti, when—after this occurred, 
you know, he had two choices; either he could go to the police 
and say it was self defense or he could try to cover it up. 
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Obviously, he opted for the--the option to--to--not to go to 
the police. 
And I think we've presented stuff from his medical 
history and his statement as to what occurred that, you know, 
we'll just submit it on that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
All right. 
MP. PERRY: And he has been in custody now for, I 
believe, about three hundred and some-odd days. We'd ask for 
credit for time served, your Honor, and maybe some 
documentation supplementing the pre-sentence report as to the 
restitution amount that is—is being asked for, 'cause we 
really don't see that. 
THE COURT: Do you want to hold that out 30 days 
based on the documentation? 
MR. PERRY: I think so, yeah. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Anything else? 
MR. PERRY: Anything else you want to say, Mr. 
Ferretti? 
THE COURT: Anything from the State? 
MR. LINTON: No, your Honor. We'll subrrut it, 
THE COURT: Mr. Ferretti, it is a very solemn 
occasion to sentence you today, not because I'm hesitant in my 
duty to do so and impose on you the justice that the law 
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requires, but because it is the end of a very long process of 
justice for your victim, Tiffany Jarman. 
I listened to the evidence presented at the 
prej-iminary nearing and iu j^ ecame Cj_ear L.O me, a j_ew unings/ 
first, you murdered this woman in cold blood and you thought 
because she was a person of little significance of this world 
that the world would not care about her murder. Fortunately, 
you were wrong. Thankfully, the world did care about Tiffany 
Jarman. Through dedicated and relentless police work, you 
were found and brought to accountability. Through the courage 
of an acquaintance, you were found and also brought to 
accountability. 
Now, you stand here today ready to be sentenced for 
this horrendous act. The State of Utah did not forget about 
Tiffany Jarman and because of that, now, you, too, get to 
remember, hopefully for the rest of your life, every day of 
your life, Tiffany Jarman as well. 
Mr. Ferretti, I hereby sentence you to prison for an 
indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be 
for life. 
I'm going to order that $15,360.63 be paid in 
restitution, pending verification of that from the State. The 
State has 30 days to verify that. If they don't verify it 
within those 30 days, that restitution is not ordered. 
I also impose a fine of $10,000 plus an 85 percent 
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surcharge on you. 
And Mr. Ferretti, I'm also going to recommend to the 
parole board that you never be released from prison, that you 
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horrendous act. And I?m writing a letter to the parole board 
to follow up on that, encouraging them to do that. 
And you will have no credit for time served. 
You have 30 days to appeal this sentence. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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